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Abstract
This thesis examines the allocation of human capital in the public sector.
I build a new global school-level database comprising 1.73 million public
primary schools in 86 countries to study the allocation of teachers
across schools across countries at different income levels. In line with
common wisdom, I find a strong negative correlation between school-
level pupil-teacher ratios (PTRs) and the level of income of a country.
More strikingly, I document that the within-country variation in PTRs is
also higher in lower income countries. This negative correlation between
PTR variation and per capita income is also found within countries over
time. Cross-country regressions and cross-district regressions within
developing countries suggest that teachers may be misallocated across
schools in developing countries: aggregate educational attainment and
PTR variation are negatively correlated - even after controlling for
differences in per capita income and aggregate PTR. I build a theoretical
framework to characterize the notion of misallocation and calibrate the
model to simulate counterfactual teacher allocations. I find that aggregate
gains in grade promotion from teacher reallocation would be substantial
in many developing countries. I finish by discussing the causes and
implications of my findings. A case study from Zambia points to lack of
managerial capacity and weak enforcement of teacher allocation policies
as important underlying factors. A comparison of the distribution
of health workers across public primary care facilities in Zambia and
England suggests that misallocation of public human resources could also
be an issue in other public sectors in developing countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Human capital is key for the delivery of public services. There would
be no schools without teachers, no hospitals without doctors, no police
stations without officers. However, a growing body of evidence points
to inefficient human capital allocation in the public sector of developing
countries. Politically driven recruitment and transfer decisions are
common and human resource management capacity is limited (Akhtari
et al. 2017, Asim et al. 2017, Beteille 2009, Lemos & Scur 2016, Sharma
& Ramachandran 2009). This raises the question to what extent human
capital is misallocated in developing countries. Echoing the literature on
capital misallocation across firms (Hsieh & Klenow 2009)1, this thesis asks
whether human capital is misallocated across public institutions.
Focusing on public primary education, I conduct a comparative anal-
ysis across 86 countries and ask whether teachers are misallocated across
public primary schools within countries. I concentrate on the public
primary school sector for four reasons. First, education is paramount
for development. Second, public primary schools are arguably one of
the most common public institutions worldwide. After all, primary
education is nearly universally free and compulsory2, and by and large
1See Restuccia & Rogerson (2017) for a recent review of the literature.
2Figures A.1 and A.2 show that primary education is free in 185 countries and
compulsory in 195 countries.
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publicly provided3. Third, teachers are the main input to primary
education, as reflected by the large share of government education
expenditure going to teacher compensation throughout the world. Across
countries, on average 63.5% of total government expenditure for public
primary education is spent on teacher compensation4. Finally, teachers
typically represent a large share of civil servants in a country, with a
majority employed in primary education.
To study the allocation of teachers across public primary schools, I
build a new global school-level data set comprising 1.73 million public
primary schools in 86 countries across all continents and income levels.
This data is largely collected from governmental Education Management
Information Systems comprising the universe of public primary schools
in 70 countries. It is complemented by data from state-level school
censuses in six countries and nationally representative surveys from ten
countries. In line with common wisdom, I document a strong negative
correlation between school-level pupil-teacher ratios (PTRs) and the level
of income of a country5. More strikingly, I find that the within-country
variation in PTRs is also higher in lower income countries. For example,
the difference between the 90th and the 10th percentile of the cross-
school PTR distribution in Mozambique is 69.7. In the UK, the equivalent
difference is as small as 10. This negative correlation between PTR
variation and per capita income is also found within countries over
time. Cross-country regressions and cross-district regressions within
developing countries suggest that teachers may be misallocated across
schools in developing countries: aggregate educational attainment and
PTR variation are negatively correlated - even after controlling for
differences in per capita income and aggregate PTR. The conjecture
3Figure A.3 shows the share of primary school pupils enrolled in public institutions
in 128 countries. 88.5% of all primary school pupils in these countries attend public
institutions.
4Figure A.4 shows teacher compensation as a share of total government expenditure
on public primary education by country.
5This relationship can also be found in publicly available data from the UNESCO
Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program Database.
See figure A.5.
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of misallocation is further supported by a third new stylized fact.
School remoteness can only explain a small share of PTR variation in
developing countries. Thus, the observed PTR differences are not simply
the consequence of differences in teacher labor supply or demand for
education between rural and urban areas.
To understand to what extent teachers are misallocated across schools
in developing countries and how large gains in aggregate education out-
comes from teacher reallocation could be, I build a theoretical framework
and calibrate it to simulate counterfactual teacher allocations. I consider
three counterfactual scenarios. First, teachers are allocated across schools
according to a rule that sets a maximum school-level PTR. In each
country, this maximum is chosen such that it is the smallest maximum
that can be achieved given the distribution of pupils across schools and
the total stock of teachers. Second, teachers are optimally allocated
across schools. Third, teachers are optimally allocated within subnational
administrative units, but cannot be reallocated across units. I simulate
these counterfactuals for 20 countries and find that aggregate gains in
grade promotion from teacher reallocation in developed countries would
be small. Gains in many developing countries in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, on the contrary, would be substantial. For example,
estimated gains from the implementation of the smallest achievable
maximum PTR rule range from approximately 1 percentage point in
Zambia to almost 4 percentage points in India. I compute that these
promotion gains imply an additional year of schooling for 1-6% of
primary school-aged children in these countries by the time they turn
22. Achieving equivalent gains through the recruitment of additional
teachers holding fixed relative PTRs between schools would require
teacher workforce increases between 6% and 40%, associated with annual
wage costs that range between 1% and 6% of total government education
expenditure. Gains from the other two counterfactuals, optimal allocation
of teachers and optimal allocation within subnational administrative
units, are estimated to be even larger. Thus, teachers appear to
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be seriously misallocated across public primary schools in developing
countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
I finish by discussing the causes and implications of my findings.
Given the large estimated gains from teacher reallocation, one has to ask
how large the costs of reallocation would be. In order to understand these
costs, the causes of teacher misallocation need to be identified in the first
place. Therefore, I conduct a case study in Zambia. In collaboration
with the Zambian Ministry of General Education, I examine budgeting,
deployment, and transfers of teachers. The resulting evidence points to
lack of managerial capacity and weak enforcement of teacher allocation
policies as important underlying factors of PTR variation. Evidence from
other countries (e.g. Asim et al. 2017, Ramachandran et al. 2018) paints a
similar picture.
These causes are unlikely to be confined to the public education
sector. Other public sectors in developing countries, such as health,
law enforcement, and administration, are likely to be similarly affected
and therefore human capital misallocation could be an important issue in
these as well. In fact, the documented stylized facts on the distribution
of public primary school teachers appear to hold in the public health
sector as well. Comparing the distribution of health workers across public
primary care facilities in Zambia and England, I find a significantly larger
dispersion in population per health worker in Zambia than in England.
Additionally, only a very small share of the differences in staffing levels
across Zambian facilities can be explained by facility remoteness.
This thesis relates to four distinct but interrelated streams of literature.
First, it joins a small nascent literature on the allocation of teachers across
schools within countries. Work by international organizations such as the
World Bank, UNESCO, and UNICEF has repeatedly drawn attention to
imbalances in school staffing across districts and schools within specific
African countries over many years (e.g. IIEP Pole de Dakar 2016, Mingat
et al. 2003, Mulkeen 2010, UNESCO 2006). In recent years, awareness
of these imbalances has increased and a few studies have examined
18
implications and causes in selected countries (Agarwal et al. 2016 and
Pelkonen & Fagernas 2017 in India, Asim et al. 2017 in Malawi). This
thesis focuses on public primary schools and adds a detailed systematic
global cross-country comparison to this literature.
Second, this thesis contributes to a long literature on the supply of
education in developing countries. This branch of literature has examined
to what extent the lack of specific resources - from flip charts (Glewwe et
al. 2004) to teacher knowledge (Bold et al. 2017), school monitoring
(Duflo et al. 2012, Muralidharan et al. 2017), management practices
(Lemos & Scur 2016), and beyond - hampers educational performance.
Rather than focusing on the effect of the lack of a given resource, this
thesis points to inefficient resource allocation as a hindrance to better
aggregate educational outcomes.
Third, it relates to the literature on the personnel economics of the
state. While the focus of this literature has been on the selection of
state-employees (Ashraf et al. 2018, Dal Bo et al. 2013) and performance
incentives (De Ree et al. 2018, Muralidharan & Sundararaman 2011), the
long tail of poorly staffed schools in many developing countries revealed
in this thesis serves as a reminder that performance-enhancing selection
and incentive schemes can only have a limited effect at such schools -
unless they also address the prevailing low staffing levels themselves.
Finally, it contributes to the literature on misallocation of production
factors across producers in two ways. First, it extends it into the public
sector and second, it looks specifically at human captial. This is unlike
most of the existing literature which has focused on the misallocation of
capital across firms (e.g. Busso et al. 2013, Hsieh & Klenow 2009).
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines a simple theoretical
framework to characterize the notion of teacher misallocation across
schools. In chapter 3, I first describe the data collection process
and the resulting data set. Then I document the above mentioned
three new stylized facts suggesting that teachers are misallocated. In
chapter 4, I calibrate the model sketched in chapter 2 and simulate
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counterfactual teacher allocations. Chapter 5 discusses the causes of
teacher misallocation presenting a case study from Zambia. In chapter 6,
I analyse the distribution of health workers across primary care facilities
in England and Zambia. Finally, chapter 7 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical framework for the
analysis of teacher allocation
In this chapter, I briefly outline a theoretical framework to characterize
the notion of teacher misallocation underlying the empirical analysis in
chapter 3.
The setup is as follows. A social planner allocates teachers across
public primary schools subject to a budget constraint. Teachers are
assumed to be homogeneous. This is for two reasons. First, there
is typically no subject specialization among primary school teachers.
Teachers usually teach all subjects to a given class. Second, differences
in teacher quality are not considered due to a lack of available data1.
The objective of the social planner is universal primary education2. As
the 2018 World Development Report states, ”most children today enroll
in primary school” (World Bank 2018), even in low-income countries3.
Therefore, I take initial enrollment of pupils as given and focus on school
1Teacher quality is typically estimated through teacher value-added models. These
require rich panel data on teachers and the performance of their pupils which is not
available in most developing countries. Teacher qualifications are more easily available,
but it is unclear in how far qualifications actually predict teacher performance.
2This is a common goal among policy makers which has been widely promoted by
international organizations. It is part of the fourth UN sustainable development goal
to ”ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and
secondary education”.
3See figure B.1 for empirical evidence.
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completion conditional on initial enrollment4. The planner’s optimization
problem can then be written as follows:
max
Ts
∑
s
Ps
∑j Pj
Hs(ts, .)
s.t. ∑
s
wsTs ≤ B
where Ps indicates the number of pupils in school s, Ts the number
of teachers, and ts = Ts/Ps is defined as the number of teachers per
pupil. Hs is the grade promotion rate, i.e. the share of pupils that
advances to the next grade. The grade promotion rate at each school is
weighted by the enrollment share of the school Ps/∑j Pj. Hence, the social
planner maximizes the total number of pupils in public primary schools
advancing to the next grade. The cost of having a teacher at school s is
ws and the budget constraint says that the total cost for teachers cannot
exceed the budget B.
I assume that the grade promotion rate H is a function of school
quality Q˜ and location-specific demand factors L:
H = h
(
Q˜, L
)
Q˜ captures school-specific inputs such as the number of teachers per
pupil t, learning materials, school infrastructure and school manage-
ment. L captures location-specific determinants of demand for primary
education, such as location-specific household preferences, returns to
education, and opportunity costs. h describes the household education
investment decision given Q˜ and L, and will henceforth be referred to as
the policy function5.
4Figure B.2 shows that there is substantial variation in primary school completion
across countries.
5See discussion in Glewwe & Muralidharan (2016).
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Given this setup, a necessary condition for an interior solution to the
social planner’s problem is
∂h
∂t (ti, Qi, Li)
wi
=
∂h
∂t (tj, Qj, Lj)
wj
(2.1)
where Q˜ = {t, Q}. This condition illustrates that in this framework
cross-school variation in three factors can rationalize PTR variation across
public primary schools:
1. School quality (ti and Qi)
2. Location-specific demand factors (Li)
3. Teacher costs (wi)
Consequently, larger variation in these factors in developing countries
than in developed countries could rationalize larger observed PTR
variation in the former. In the next chapter, I examine this empirically
in order to determine to what extent teachers are indeed misallocated
across public primary schools in developing countries.
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Chapter 3
Cross-country comparison of the
distribution of teachers across
public primary schools
3.1 Data
In order to examine the distribution of teachers across public primary
schools, I collected school-level data on pupil-teacher ratios for the
universe of public primary schools in 70 countries. This data is
supplemented by state-level school censuses from six countries and
nationally representative school- and household survey data from an
additional ten countries. Below I describe the data collection process and
the resulting data set.
3.1.1 Data collection
Data collection was carried out in three steps as detailed below.
First, I visited the website of the Ministry of Education of every
country in the world to look for school census data. If a Ministry of
Education did not have a website or I could not find school census data
on their website, I visited the website of the Central Statistical Agency.
In countries with a decentralized administration of the education system
(e.g. Canada) I also visited websites of subnational education authorities.
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This way I found publicly available school census data online for 47
countries.
In a second step, I sent a data request letter to the Ministry of
Education and/or Central Statistical Agency of all remaining countries
as long as a point of contact (email address or personal contact) could
be found. In some countries with decentralized education systems, data
requests were sent to state- or province-level authorities. Overall, I sent
out more than 250 data requests in five different languages and collected
data from 39 countries this way.
Third, for all countries where neither of the two previous approaches
had been successful, I checked the availability of nationally representative
school survey data with information on school-level PTRs. This way, data
for another ten countries was added.
Overall, I obtained data from 86 countries in 14 different languages
and many different formats. Finally, I synchronized language and format
of the data across countries. Table C.1 gives a detailed overview of the all
the data sources and the following subsection provides a description of
the resulting data set.
3.1.2 Core data
The final data set contains school-level PTR data from 86 different coun-
tries across all continents and income levels. As previously mentioned,
countries can be subdivided into three categories. First, for 70 countries,
school census data for the national universe of public primary schools
was obtained1. Second, for six countries, school census data was only
obtained from a subset of states or provinces (covering the universe of
public primary schools within those). Third, nationally representative
1It is difficult to assess whether the school census data indeed covers all public
primary schools in each of the sample countries and states. However, data on school
census return rates from public schools across 49 African countries from the UNESCO
Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program Database
suggests that even in low-income countries data is fairly complete. Return rates are
on average 97.3% and only in a handful of countries they are below 90%. See figure C.1.
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survey data was collected for ten countries. Figure 3.1 provides an
overview of the geographical coverage of the data set.
Figure 3.1: Data coverage
The final data set contains information on more than 1.73 million
public primary schools attended by a total of approximately 273 million
primary school pupils. Given a total world population between the age
of 5 and 14 of roughly 1.24 billion in 2015, this means it covers about 22%
of all primary school pupils worldwide. The total number of teachers
working at these schools adds up to almost 12 million.
For each country, the year of the data corresponds to the latest
available year at the time of data collection. The majority of the data
is from the time period between 2013 and 2017. Only 7 out of 86 country-
level data sets are from before 2013, with the earliest data from Botswana
in 20092. Table 3.1 specifies the year of the data for each country and
provides basic summary statistics for each country. Further details are
documented in table C.1.
PTRs are generally computed as the ratio of pupil headcount over
teacher headcount3. While it would be desirable to use full-time
equivalents instead of headcounts, such data is rarely available. Hence,
for the sake of comparability headcounts are used whenever possible.
2Figure C.2 shows the number of data sets by year.
3Note that school-level teacher headcounts imply that teachers are counted
repeatedly if they work in several schools simultaneously.
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However, in ten countries teacher headcounts were not available. In seven
of these, teacher full-time equivalents could be obtained instead4. In the
remaining three countries, the total number of school staff (teachers plus
management/administration personnel) was used as the denominator5.
While the data is generally restricted to public primary schools, in five
countries the data also contains private primary schools as these cannot
be differentiated from public schools in the source data. However, in all
of these countries the number of private primary schools is negligibly
small6.
The age at which children start primary education varies little across
countries, and is always between 5 and 77. Primary education is most
commonly provided through primary schools, but in some countries
other school types also provide primary education. For example,
in Mongolia primary education is mainly provided at comprehensive
schools that run from grade 1 to 12. In order to maintain comparability
across schools within each country, I restrict the data to the types of school
that are the primary providers of primary education. Table 3.1 lists the
included types of schools for each country8. The number of grades taught
in these schools varies substantially across countries and is also indicated
in the table. It reaches from 4 to 12 grades. Primary schools with 6 grades
are the most common type9.
4The respective countries where teacher full-time equivalents are used to compute
school-level PTRs are Brazil, Canada, Ireland, Puerto Rico, Sweden, the UK, and the US.
5The respective countries where school staff headcounts were used instead of teacher
headcounts are Belgium (Flanders), Fiji, and France.
6The respective countries where the data also contains private primary schools are
Cape Verde (0.97%), Fiji (0.86%), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (10.57%), Swaziland
(1.55%), and Ukraine (0.58%). The percentage of enrolment in primary education in
private institutions in 2015 is given in brackets (source: World Bank International
Comparison Program Database). The information for Swaziland is from 2014 as 2015
data was not available.
7Figure C.3 shows the distribution of primary school entrance age across all sample
countries. The underlying data is from 2015 and was extracted from the website of the
UNESCO Institute for Statistics on 13/07/2017.
8Apart from the indicated grades, schools may also include pre-primary education.
9Figure C.4 shows the distribution of the maximum number of grades taught at
included school types across sample countries.
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The survey data used to supplement the school census data comes
from two sources. First, data for nine French-speaking countries in
West Africa was obtained from PASEC (Programme d’Analyse des
Systemes Educatifs de la Conference des ministres de l’Education des
Etats et Gouvernements de la Francophonie). In 2014, PASEC carried
out nationally representative surveys of primary schools in these nine
countries and collected data on the total number of pupils and teachers
in each school through interviews with school principals10. I restrict
the sample of schools in each country to public primary schools, and
use sample weights to construct the distribution of PTRs across public
primary schools.
Finally, data for Kenya is from UWEZO 2014. This is a nationally
representative household survey to assess learning of children, similar to
the well-known ASER survey in India. Households are selected through
a three stage sampling process. First, districts are randomly drawn (with
equal probability). Then enumeration areas (villages) are picked with
selection probability proportional to size, and within each enumeration
area households are randomly selected. In addition, a government
primary school is surveyed in every sample village. The cross-school PTR
distribution is constructed based on the schools contained in the UWEZO
sample.
Neither the PASEC nor the UWEZO school surveys were designed
to generate a nationally representative picture of the PTR variation
across public primary schools in the respective countries. Therefore, the
measures of cross-school PTR variation for these ten countries which are
derived below should be regarded as tentative. All the subsequent results
are robust to dropping these ten countries, and the corresponding results
are available in the appendix.
10The sample frame included all schools with at least one class in grade 6. The
probability of drawing a specific school was proportional to the total number of grade 6
pupils in a school.
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3.1.3 Complementary data
Two types of complementary data were collected along with the core data.
First, for a subset of 20 countries, not only the latest available school
census, but school census data going as far back as possible was obtained.
Table C.2 lists those countries and indicates the years for which data was
available.
Second, data on the location of schools was collected. For all but
three countries with census data, information on the region in which
each school is located was gathered. For 51 countries, subregions were
also obtained. A region was defined as the highest administrative
division available (e.g. state or province) or the statistical division that
is closest to it (e.g. NUTS-2). A subregion was analogously defined as
the second highest administrative division available (e.g. district) or the
statistical division that is closest to it (e.g. NUTS-3). Table C.3 provides
further details including the definition of a region and a subregion used
throughout this paper for each country.
In addition, for 51 countries GPS coordinates of schools were gathered.
These were either downloaded or requested from the corresponding
Ministry of Education. For 34 countries, GPS coordinates were available,
for 17 countries school addresses were transformed into GPS coordinates
using Google Maps Geocoding API. For few countries, coordinates for
all schools could be obtained, but overall the coordinate data is fairly
complete. The share of schools for which coordinates are available is on
average 94%. Table C.4 provides detailed information on the data source
for each country and the completeness of the data11.
11Quality of the data varies across countries. In a few countries, a relatively large
share of schools has identical coordinates as at least one other public primary school.
Table C.4 provides details. In such cases, there may either be several schools within
the same building or coordinates do not reflect the actual location of the school, but
rather the centroid of the administrative division within which a school is located.
Without additional information, it is not possible to differentiate between these two
cases. Therefore, all subsequent results using GPS coordinates are replicated including
and excluding schools that share identical coordinates with other schools.
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Table 3.1: Data summary
Country Data type Year School types (grades) Schools Pupils (K) Teachers (K)
Antigua and Barbuda Census 2010/11 PRIM (1-6) 30 5.1 0.4
Argentina Census 2015 PRIM (1-6, 1-7) 18408 3482.3 273.6
Australia Census 2016 PRIM (1-6) 4735 1437.3 95.6
Austria Census* 2016/17 PRIM (1-4) 1771 176.1 20.0
Belgium Census* 2017 PRIM (1-6) 918 267.4 29.9
Benin Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 133 44.1 0.7
Bhutan Census 2015 PRIM (1-6) 413 45.4 2.5
Botswana Census 2009 PRIM (1-7) 707 298.4 11.5
Brazil Census 2015 PRIM (1-8, 1-9) 79805 22132.3 1040.3
Burkina Faso Census 2017 PRIM (1-6) 11537 2429.0 58.4
Burundi Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 165 102.8 2.6
Cambodia Census 2014 PRIM (1-6) 6164 1784.0 40.6
Cameroon Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 177 47.4 0.9
Canada Census* 2014-16 PRIM (1-5, 1-8) 3471 1326.1 73.7
Cape Verde Census 2014/15 PRIM (1-6) 407 63.6 2.9
Chad Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 93 42.9 0.7
Chile Census 2015 PRIM (1-8) 3764 666.2 56.5
Colombia Census 2015 PRIM (1-5) 39953 3488.8 40.0
Congo, Rep. Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 81 35.0 0.4
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Table 3.1: Data summary
Country Data type Year School types (grades) Schools Pupils (K) Teachers (K)
Costa Rica Census 2016 PRIM (1-6) 3674 538.7 28.6
Cote d’Ivoire Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 144 40.9 0.8
Czech Republic Census 2017 PRIM (1-9) 3900 886.8 70.4
Denmark Census 2015/16 COMP (1-10, 1-11) 1204 524.6 55.0
Djibouti Census 2014/15 PRIM (1-5) 132 56.3 1.6
Dominican Republic Census 2016/17 PRIM (1-6) 3936 777.4 40.7
Ecuador Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-7) 9245 790.1 33.1
El Salvador Census 2013 PRIM (1-9) 4224 912.1 30.1
Estonia Census 2016 PRIM (1-3, 1-6) 415 79.7 10.5
Fiji Census 2017 PRIM (1-6) 691 142.3 5.7
France Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-5) 29550 3930.9 189.4
Georgia Census 2016 COMP (1-12) 1587 486.7 53.1
Germany Census* 2014/15 PRIM (1-4) 2017 389.8 28.5
Guatemala Census 2015 PRIM (1-3, 1-6, 4-6) 19448 2453.2 108.4
Guinea-Bissau Census 2014 PRIM (1-4, 1-6) 694 170.7 5.7
Honduras Census 2012 PRIM (1-6, 1-9) 11440 1192.8 79.4
Hungary Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-8) 2952 629.4 65.0
India Census 2015 PRIM (1-5, 6-8, 1-8) 981351 97279.2 3825.0
Ireland Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-6) 3124 541.0 31.8
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Table 3.1: Data summary
Country Data type Year School types (grades) Schools Pupils (K) Teachers (K)
Jamaica Census 2015 PRIM (1-6) 377 136.0 4.7
Kenya Survey 2014 PRIM (1-8) 4135 2373.6 68.6
Kiribati Census 2011 PRIM (1-6) 94 15.5 0.6
Kyrgyzstan Census 2015 COMP (1-11) 1674 822.8 60.6
Laos Census 2016/17 PRIM (1-5) 8606 807.4 38.1
Latvia Census 2016 PRIM (1-6) & BAS (1-9) 369 51.0 7.4
Liberia Census 2015 PRIM (1-6) & BAS (1-9) 2486 335.7 12.2
Libya Census 2012 PRIM (1-6) & BAS (1-9) 3194 1005.4 175.9
Lithuania Census 2016 PRIM (1-4) & BAS (1-10) 555 57.3 4.5
Madagascar Census 2016 PRIM (1-5) 24447 3857.8 89.8
Malawi Census 2016 PRIM (1-8) 5404 4703.5 68.4
Marshall Islands Census 2013/14 PRIM (1-8) 80 9.7 0.7
Mexico Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-6) 88991 12969.9 514.0
Moldova Census 2016 PRIM (1-4) & BAS (1-9) 906 69.3 4.4
Mongolia Census 2016 BAS (1-9) & COMP (1-12) 614 272.1 8.9
Mozambique Census 2016 PRIM (1-5, 6-7, 1-7) 12386 5815.3 108.2
Netherlands Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-8) 2059 437.1 36.2
New Zealand Census 2015 PRIM (1-5, 1-7, 6-7) 1691 405.1 26.1
Niger Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 166 61.8 1.5
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Table 3.1: Data summary
Country Data type Year School types (grades) Schools Pupils (K) Teachers (K)
Norway Census 2016/17 PRIM (1-7) 2114 429.4 40.6
Pakistan Census* 2013-16 PRIM (1-5) 80593 7044.5 206.6
Palau Census 2016 PRIM (1-6) 18 1.8 0.2
Papua New Guinea Census 2016 PRIM (1-6) 4264 732.9 19.8
Paraguay Census 2013/14 PRIM (1-6, 1-9) 5176 676.2 62.3
Peru Census 2016 PRIM (1-6) 29141 2563.5 140.6
Philippines Census 2013/14 PRIM (1-6) 37948 14952.8 377.5
Poland Census 2017 PRIM (1-6) 9577 2675.3 331.1
Puerto Rico Census 2014/15 PRIM (1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8) 771 180.8 14.0
St Kitts and Nevis Census 2013/14 PRIM (1-6) 24 4.3 0.3
St Lucia Census 2014/15 PRIM (1-9) 74 15.8 1.0
St Vincent and the Grenadines Census 2014/15 PRIM (1-6) 68 13.4 0.9
Samoa Census 2015 PRIM (1-8) 143 33.7 1.1
Senegal Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 134 68.6 1.4
Seychelles Census 2012 PRIM (1-6) 24 10.4 0.9
South Africa Census 2015 PRIM (1-7) 13781 6497.8 190.8
South Sudan Census 2015 PRIM (1-8) 2409 884.7 20.2
Sudan Census* 2012 PRIM (1-8) 1309 498.0 17.1
Suriname Census 2016 PRIM (1-7) 333 69.6 5.9
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Table 3.1: Data summary
Country Data type Year School types (grades) Schools Pupils (K) Teachers (K)
Swaziland Census 2013 PRIM (1-7) 591 235.2 8.2
Sweden Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-9) 3982 838.4 68.8
Tanzania Census 2016 PRIM (1-7) 14598 7489.3 172.5
Togo Survey 2014 PRIM (1-6) 141 35.9 0.7
UK Census 2015/16 PRIM (1-4) 20118 5289.6 255.1
US Census 2014/15 PRIM (1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8) 51732 24046.2 1471.0
Uganda Census 2016 PRIM (1-7) 11357 6702.4 122.4
Ukraine Census 2013/14 COMP (1-10, 1-11) 16370 3771.4 443.0
Uruguay Census 2015 PRIM (1-6) 1953 247.8 11.4
Zambia Census 2015 PRIM (1-7) & BAS (1-9) 5790 2864.1 62.0
The table indicates three different types of data: census, census*, and survey. Census means that data for the universe public primary schools
was collected. Census* indicates that data for the universe of public primary schools was collected from a subset of the highest administrative
divisions in the country. See table C.1 for details. Survey indicates that the collected data is from a nationally representative school or household
survey. Column (4) lists the included school types for each country and the typical grade range at these schools. PRIM stands for primary, BAS for
basic, and COMP for comprehensive. Apart from the indicated grades, schools may also include pre-primary education. The last three columns
provide information on the total number of schools, pupils and teachers contained in the data. Totals are computed after dropping schools for
which PTR information was not available. See table C.1 for details on the share of public primary schools without PTR information.
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3.2 Stylized facts
In this section, I compare the distribution of teachers across public
primary schools between and within countries based on the assembled
data. I document three new stylized facts that are jointly suggestive
of teacher misallocation across public primary schools in developing
countries. These facts are:
1. PTR variation is negatively correlated with per capita income, both
across countries and within countries across time.
2. PTR variation is negatively correlated with aggregate education
outcomes even after controlling for differences in income and
aggregate PTRs.
3. In low- and lower-middle-income countries, PTRs are larger in
remote schools, but remoteness can only explain a small share of
overall PTR variation.
The first two facts on their own are suggestive of misallocation. The
third fact rules out that PTR variation in developing countries can be
rationalized by spatial variation in teacher labor supply or demand for
education between rural and urban areas.
3.2.1 Fact 1
PTR variation is negatively correlated with per capita income, both across
countries and within countries across time.
Figure 3.2 shows the PTR distribution across public primary schools in
four different countries - a low-income country (Mozambique), a lower-
middle-income country (India), an upper-middle income country (Peru)
and a high-income country (UK) - in black12. Grey dashed lines represent
12The data for each country are trimmed at bottom and the top. The 1st and the 99th
percentile of the PTR distribution are excluded. All the following results are robust to
including these.
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the enrollment-weighted PTR distribution across public primary schools.
A comparison of these four distributions yields three observations. First,
average PTR in the low-income country Mozambique is substantially
higher than in the other countries. While the mean PTR is 59.8 in
Mozambique, it is only 24.9 in India, 14.2 in Peru and 20.4 in the UK.
Second, cross-school PTR variation is large in the lower income countries,
but small in the higher income countries. The cross-school PTR standard
deviation amounts to 27.4 and 18.2, respectively, in Mozambique and
India, but it measures only 6.8 and 3.8, respectively, in Peru and the UK13.
Third, the poorer a country, the longer is the right tail of schools with
high PTRs. These three cross-country observations hold independently
of whether schools are weighted by their enrollment or not. They also
hold across countries more generally and I document this below.
As outlined in the introduction, it is known that aggregate PTRs in
primary education are higher in low income-countries14. Since the large
majority of primary education is publicly provided, it is not surprising
that figure 3.3 confirms this relationship for the public primary education
sector15.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the negative relationship between cross-school
PTR variation in the public primary education sector and per capita
income across countries. It plots the cross-school PTR standard deviation
within each country against per capita income. Note that the negative
association between PTR dispersion and per capita income is not simply
a consequence of high aggregate PTRs in low-income countries. While
it can be shown through simulations that the indivisibility of teachers
causes PTR variation to increase in aggregate PTR even if the objective is
13All figures are based on the unweighted distributions illustrated in black.
14See figure A.5.
15For a given country, the national aggregate PTR is computed as the total number
of pupils over the total number of teachers in all public primary schools contained in
the data. The total number of teachers is computed as the sum of teacher headcounts
over all schools. To the extent that teachers work in several schools simultaneously
and are counted repeatedly, computed national aggregate PTRs will underestimate
actual national aggregate PTRs. Per capita income data comes from the World Bank
International Comparison Program Database.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of PTRs across public primary schools in selected
countries
Histograms show the distribution of PTRs across the universe of public primary schools in
the selected countries. The grey dashed line in each subfigure indicates the cross-school PTR
distribution when schools are weighted by their enrollment.
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Figure 3.3: National PTR in public primary education and income across
countries
The national PTR in public primary education is defined as the total number of pupils in public
primary schools over the total number of teachers in these schools. Since these totals are not
available for the ten countries with survey data, these countries are not included in the figure.
Marker size indicates the size of the primary school-aged population (ages 5 to 14) in a country.
GDP per capita and population data are from the World Bank International Comparison Program
database.
to equalize PTRs across schools, this effect is quantitatively small relative
to the PTR variation observed in low- and middle-income countries16.
Moreover, the relationship between PTR variation and per capita income
remains significantly negative when the coefficient of variation is used as
an alternative measure of PTR variation17.
Finally, figure 3.5 confirms the earlier observation that there is a long
right tail of schools with high PTRs in lower income countries which
does not exist in higher income countries. The length of the tail of the
distribution is measured by the difference between the 90th and the 50th
percentile of the cross-school PTR distribution. The long right tail in
many developing countries implies that a lot of children attend schools
with few teachers - even in countries where national PTRs in the public
16See appendix section ?? for details.
17See figure C.7.
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Figure 3.4: PTR variation in public primary education and income across
countries
The PTR standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation in PTRs across all public
primary schools within a country. The grey line is a linear regression line. Marker size indicates
the size of the primary school-aged population (ages 5 to 14) in a country. GDP per capita and
population data are from the World Bank International Comparison Program database.
primary education sector are not extremely high. In India, for example,
34.2% of public primary education pupils attend schools with a PTR
above 40 despite a national PTR of 24.9. Across all sample countries
with census data, 5.6% of children (about 15 million) are enrolled in
schools with PTRs above 80 while this share could be reduced to zero
if teachers were more evenly distributed across public primary schools
within countries.
The documented relationship between per capita income and cross-
school PTR variation in the public primary education sector does not only
hold across countries but can also be observed within countries across
time. This suggests that the cross-country relationship is not merely
driven by time-invariant differences between countries that are correlated
with income (e.g. geography). Figure 3.6 shows the combined time series
of the cross-school PTR standard deviation and per capita income for the
20 countries where such data was collected. It stands out that at low levels
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Figure 3.5: Right tail of the cross-school PTR distribution and income
across countries
The PTR 90-50 difference is defined as the difference between the 90th percentile and the median
of the PTR distribution across all public primary schools within a country. Marker size indicates
the size of the primary school-aged population (ages 5 to 14) in a country. GDP per capita and
population data are from the World Bank International Comparison Program database.
of GDP per capita there is a strong negative relationship between per
capita income and PTR variation whereas there is hardly any relationship
at high income levels.
3.2.2 Fact 2
PTR variation is negatively correlated with aggregate education outcomes even
after controlling for differences in income and aggregate PTRs.
Table 3.2 shows that across countries, aggregate primary school attain-
ment is negatively correlated with PTR variation, even after controlling
for differences in per capita income, population and aggregate PTR. An
increase in the within-country PTR standard deviation from 25th to the
75th percentile in the cross-country distribution is associated with an
8.43 (7.03) percentage point decrease in the primary school completion
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Figure 3.6: PTR variation in public primary education and income over
time across countries
The figure illustrates the joint path of the cross-school PTR standard deviation in public primary
education and per capita income for 20 countries. Country codes indicate which time series
represents which country. The time span covered by the underlying time series data is given
in brackets. The starting point of each time series is marked by a dot and the end point by an
arrow. The PTR standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation in PTRs across all public
primary schools within a country in a given year. GDP per capita data is from the World Bank
International Comparison Program database.
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(survival) rate18. Moreover, columns (3) and (6) indicate that the negative
partial correlation between the PTR standard deviation and primary
schooling outcomes is driven by lower income countries whereas there
is no significant correlation for higher income countries.
While these correlations are intriguing, they could entirely be driven
by omitted country characteristics, such as institutional quality. To
alleviate this concern to a certain extent, I replicate the above cross-
country analysis comparing subregions (districts) within specific low-
and middle-income countries. This is feasible because a substantial share
of PTR variation in developing countries is within subregions. Figure
3.7 shows the spatial variation of PTRs across public primary schools
in Zambia. The map indicates areas around schools with high PTRs in
increasingly dark shades of red and areas around school with low PTRs
with increasingly dark shades of green. It stands out that the heat map
is relatively spotty, i.e. there is a lot of variation even within districts.
A similar pattern can be observed in other developing countries19. A
PTR variance decomposition shows that both between- and within-region
and -subregion variation are larger in lower income countries. But while
within- and between-variation are of similar magnitude in high-income
countries, in lower income countries the within-variation is substantially
larger than the between-variation20.
Cross-district regressions in Mozambique, India, and Peru reveal a
similar pattern as the above cross-country reression (see table 3.3). In all
three countries, there is a significant negative correlation between public
primary schooling outcomes and cross-school PTR variation within
18The primary school survival rate is defined as the survival rate until the last
grade of primary education. Outcome variables are from the UNESCO Institute
for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program Database. See
http://data.uis.unesco.org/ for details. For each country the most recent available data
as of 06/05/2017 is used. Note that data is not available for all sample countries.
In addition, countries with survey data are excluded from the regression because the
national aggregate PTR is not available for these countries.
19PTR heat maps from other countries where school coordinates were obtained are
available upon request.
20See figures C.10 and C.11.
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Table 3.2: PTR variation and primary schooling outcomes across countries
Primary school completion Primary school survival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National PTR -0.00476∗∗ -0.000242 -0.000681 -0.00556∗∗∗ -0.00196 -0.00213
(0.00199) (0.00265) (0.00270) (0.00146) (0.00201) (0.00197)
PTR SD -0.0128∗∗ -0.0107∗∗
(0.00518) (0.00428)
(PTR SD)x(GDP pc high) -0.00662 -0.00243
(0.00869) (0.00625)
(PTR SD)x(GDP pc low) -0.0122∗∗ -0.0108∗∗
(0.00522) (0.00419)
log GDP pc 0.0493∗∗ 0.0257 0.0162 0.0723∗∗∗ 0.0529∗∗∗ 0.0382∗
(0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0271) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0208)
log Population -0.00117 0.00525 0.00461 -0.00989 -0.00322 -0.00370
(0.00792) (0.00806) (0.00810) (0.00643) (0.00670) (0.00657)
R2 0.418 0.470 0.477 0.730 0.759 0.773
N 67 67 67 57 57 57
Mean Dep. Var. 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.837 0.837 0.837
PTR SD IQR 6.598 6.598 6.598 6.598 6.598 6.598
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The primary school survival rate is defined as the survival rate until the last grade of
primary education. The latest available data as of 06/05/2017 is used for each country.
”Log GDP pc” is the logarithm of the GDP per capita in PPP terms. ”GDP pc low
(high)” is a dummy variable that takes value one when the logarithm of the GDP per
capita in PPP terms is below (above) the median. Outcome variables and income and
population data (both 2015) are from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World
Bank International Comparison Program Database. The national PTR is defined as the
ratio of the total number of public primary school pupils over the total number of public
primary school teachers in a country. The PTR SD is defined as the PTR standard
deviation across all public primary schools in a country. PTR SD IQR indicates the
interquartile range in the PTR SD across countries. See tables C.5 and C.6 for robustness
checks. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 3.7: PTR heat map Zambia
The heat map shows the spatial variation in PTRs across public primary schools in Zambia. The
map indicates areas around schools with high PTRs in increasingly dark shades of red and areas
around school with low PTRs with increasingly dark shades of green. The map is based on all
public primary schools for which school coordinates were available (see table C.4).
districts21, even after controlling for differences in income as proxied by
nighttime luminosity, population, and aggregate PTR. In Mozambique an
increase in the within-district PTR standard deviation from the 25th to the
75th percentile of the cross-district PTR standard deviation distribution
is associated with a 3.2 percentage point decrease in the annual grade
promotion rate in public primary education. Over 5 years of primary
education, this accumulates to a difference of 14 percentage points in
completion rates. In India, the pass rate at the national grade 5 exams
in the district at the 75th percentile of the PTR standard deviation
distribution is 11.5 percentage points lower than the one of the district
at the 25th percentile. And even in Peru where PTR dispersion varies
21In Peru districts are called provincias.
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relatively little across districts and grade completion rates are high, there
is a difference in annual grade promotion rates of 0.9 percentage points
between the districts at the 75th and the 25th percentile. As in the case of
Mozambique, this implies a substantially larger gap in completion rates
after 5 years, namely of about 3.8 percentage points.
Table 3.3: PTR variation and public primary schooling outcomes across
districts
Mozambique India Peru
Grade promotion rate Grade 5 exam pass rate Grade promotion rate
Nighttime Luminosity 0.00656 -0.00563∗∗∗ 0.000228
(0.0118) (0.00122) (0.00101)
log Population 0.0153 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.00725) (0.00206)
District PTR -0.000673 0.00565∗∗∗ -0.00236∗∗∗
(0.000867) (0.00125) (0.000666)
PTR SD -0.00238∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.00365∗∗
(0.000922) (0.00171) (0.00154)
R2 0.106 0.114 0.267
N 142 616 195
Mean Dep. Var. 0.751 0.587 0.956
PTR SD IQR 13.2874 9.6222 2.4872
In Peru, districts are called provincias. Nighttime luminosity is defined as the median
nighttime luminosity across grid cells within a district in 2015. VIIRS nighttime lights
data is from the Earth Observation Group, NOAA National Geophysical Data Center.
Population data for each district is from the latest available census from each country
(Mozambique 2017, India 2011, Peru 2007). The district PTR is defined as the ratio of the
total number of public primary school pupils over the total number of public primary
school teachers in a district. The PTR SD is defined as the PTR standard deviation across
all public primary schools in a district. PTR SD IQR indicates the interquartile range in
the PTR SD across districts. Table C.1 indicates the sources of the PTR and outcome
variables. The promotion completion rates in Mozambique and Peru are defined as
the share of public primary school pupils that pass on to the next grade at the end of
the school year. The grade 5 exam pass rate in India is defined as the share of public
primary school pupils that pass the national grade 5 examination with a score of 60 or
above. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.2.3 Fact 3
In low- and lower-middle-income countries, PTRs are larger in remote schools,
but remoteness can only explain a small share of overall PTR variation.
To assess to what extent school remoteness can explain variation in
PTRs in developing countries, I construct four distinct measures of school
remoteness for all schools for which coordinates were obtained:
1. Population density within a circle of 3km radius around the school
based on Global Human Settlement (GHS) data
2. Population density within a circle of 3km radius around the school
based on data from the Gridded Population of the World (v4)
3. Nighttime luminosity within a circle of 3km radius around the
school based on 2015 data from the Earth Observation Group,
NOAA National Geophysical Data Center
4. Travel time to closest city based on the accessibility to cities dataset
from the Malaria Atlas Project at Oxford University (Weiss et al.
2018)
Figure 3.8 shows kernel density estimates of the PTR distribution by
quartile of school remoteness as measured by population density (GHS)
in Mozambique22. The figure makes clear how much variation in PTRs
there is within each quartile and how little of the variation is explained
by remoteness.
To test whether this is also the case in other countries, I run a separate
regression of the following form for each country with available school
coordinates:
PTRs = αr + βremotes
where αr stands for a set of region fixed effects and remotes for the
remoteness of school s as measured by one of the four measures listed
22Results look very similar for the other three measures of remoteness. See figures
C.12, C.13 and C.14
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Figure 3.8: PTR distribution by quartile of population density (GHS) in
Mozambique
Population density at each public primary school is measured as the density within a circle of
3km radius around the school according to data from the Global Human Settlement project.
above. Figure 3.9 plots the estimated regression coefficients and the
adjusted within-region R2 for each country against per capita income.
I find that remoteness is weakly positively correlated with PTRs in
developing countries, but it can only explain a very small share of the
overall variation in PTRs as indicated by the low R2 in these countries23.
The presented evidence suggests that there could be sizable gains
from distributing teachers more equally across schools. Additionally, the
fact that a large share of cross-school PTR variation is within subregions
means that teacher re-allocation within these could go a long way towards
a more balanced distribution. In order to assess how large gains in
aggregate education could actually be I proceed by further developing the
23The remoteness measure underlying the figure is population density as given by
GHS, but results look very similar using the other measures. See figures C.15, C.16 and
C.17. A corresponding analysis using rural/urban indicators as provided in the school
census data in a subset of 30 countries also leads to similar conclusions. See figure C.18.
Since the underlying rural/urban indicators are not comparable across countries, results
should be interpreted with care.
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(a) Regression coefficient
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(b) Within-region R2
Figure 3.9: PTRs and population density (GHS) across countries by
income
Beta is the regression coefficient from a country-specific school-level regression of PTR on
population density within a circle of 3km around the school as given by Global Human Settlement
data, controlling for region fixed effects. The adjusted within-region R2 is from the same
regression. Regions are defined as detailed in table C.3. The sample is restricted to 51 countries
for which school coordinates were obtained. GDP per capita data is from the World Bank
International Comparison Program database.
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initially presented theoretical framework, calibrating the resulting model,
and simulating alternative teacher distributions in the following section.
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Chapter 4
Gains from Teacher Reallocation?
Model Calibration and
Simulation
In order to gain an understanding of the potential gains from teacher re-
allocation and thereby the extent of current misallocation, I simulate three
distinct counterfactual scenarios across 20 countries:
1. Smallest achievable maximum PTR rule
2. Optimal allocation
3. Optimal allocation within subnational units
In the first case, I ask how large gains in aggregate grade promotion of
public primary school pupils would be if countries distributed teachers
according to a rule that sets a maximum school-level PTR. In each country,
this maximum is chosen such that it is the smallest maximum that can
be achieved given the distribution of pupils across schools and the total
stock of teachers. In the second case, I ask what the optimal allocation
of teachers would be such that aggregate grade promotion is maximized.
The third case restricts teacher reallocation to within subnational units
(e.g. states or districts) and examines the optimal allocation under this
restriction. I estimate reallocation gains using a calibrated model that
originates from the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2. This
model is presented in the next section.
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4.1 Model calibration
In chapter 2, the social planner’s problem was formalized as follows:
max
Ts
∑
s
Ps
∑j Pj
h(ts, Qs, Ls)
s.t. ∑
s
wsTs ≤ B
In order to take this framework to the data, two key elements need to
be modelled and calibrated:
1. The effect of school-level PTR on grade promotion ∂h∂PTR (PTRs, Qs, Ls)
2. Relative teacher costs wi/wj
Ideally, one would like to understand the precise functional form of
∂h
∂PTR (PTRs, Qs, Ls). As I argue in the next subsection, this is not possible
given the limited available empirical evidence. Therefore, I parameterize
the policy function h with two parameters. Additionally, I argue that
teacher costs are approximately equal between schools.
4.1.1 The effect of PTR on grade promotion
The school-level PTR is likely to affect pupil achievement through at least
three channels. The first and most studied one of these is class size.
A smaller number of teachers at a given school is likely to go hand in
hand with larger class sizes. The second channel is multigrade teaching.
Especially in small schools, a lack of teachers is frequently accompanied
by multigrade teachhing. The third channel is instruction time. If the
number of teachers in a school is not sufficient, multiple shifts can be
introduced to avoid overcrowded classrooms. In such cases, instruction
time is reduced as the working time of teachers is distributed across shifts.
Below I briefly discuss the available empirical evidence on each of these
three channels.
The empirical evidence on class-size effects is mixed. Some papers
find small negative effects on test scores (e.g. Angrist & Lavy 1999,
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Krueger 1999), others find no significant effects (e.g. Hoxby 2000, Angrist
et al. 2017). It also has to be noticed that most studies are based in
developed countries where class sizes rarely exceed 40. Therefore, it is
unclear in how far their findings apply to developing country settings.
The only existing study from a developing country with large class
sizes reports small positive effects from class size reductions (Duflo et
al. 2015). However, the authors of this study stress the importance of
complementary inputs, especially teacher incentives, for the effectiveness
of class size reductions.
Evidence on the other two channels is more clear-cut. Evidence on
the effects of multi-grade teaching is limited, but the available research
suggests that it is harmful to student performance (Checchi & De Paola
2017, Jacob et al. 2008). The literature on the effects of instruction time
on pupil performance finds largely positive effects (e.g. Lavy 2015).
However, it also points out that magnitudes depend on the quality of
instruction and children’s alternative time use (e.g. Rivkin and Schiman
2015)1.
There is only one paper that directly investigates the effect of school-
level PTRs on pupil performance. Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2013)
conducted a randomized control trial across public primary schools
in rural Andhra Pradesh, India. Treatment schools obtained an extra
contract teacher. This induced an average PTR reduction by 10.814 (after
two years). The authors show that a one unit reduction in PTR led to an
increase in standardized test scores by 0.0144 standard deviations. They
do not find any evidence of heterogeneous effects with respect to student
and household characteristics2.
In order to translate these effects on standardized test scores into
effects on grade promotion rates, I assume that test scores are normally
distributed. In this case, standardized test scores are standard normally
distributed. Given that only pupils with sufficiently high test scores are
1See the literature section Barrios & Bovini (2017) for a short summary of the
literature.
2Chin (2005) also finds positive effects from adding teachers to small schools in India
on school completion rates, but does not report the induced reductions in PTRs.
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promoted to the next grade, I parameterize the policy function as follows:
Hs = 1−Φ
(
αs − βPsTs
)
where αs indicates the productivity level of school s and Φ indicates
the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Given the current
promotion rate cs and PTR rs as well as β, I back out αs:
αs = Φ−1(1− cs) + βrs
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) estimate the average effect
of treatment-induced PTR reduction after one and two years. After one
year the effect amounts to 0.0099, after two years to 0.0144. It is unknown
whether the effect increases further in subsequent periods. To understand
the long-run effects of teacher reallocation, it would be desirable to set
beta to its long-run value. But in absence of empirical evidence, I set
β = 0.0144 assuming no further increases in the effect after the second
year. Figure 4.1 illustrates the resulting policy functions for a low- and a
high-productivity school.
4.1.2 Relative teacher costs
It is well known that teachers prefer working in urban areas (Fagernas
& Pelkonen 2012, Sow 2016) and governments of developing countries
report problems with teacher recruitment and retention in rural areas.
In order to attract teachers to rural schools governments frequently pay
hardship allowances (Pugatch & Schroeder 2013). But while school
remoteness is positively correlated with PTRs as suggested by this
evidence, it can only explain a small share of overall PTR variation in
developing countries as shown in chapter 3 (fact 3). I assume that school
remoteness as measured by population density, nighttime luminosity and
travel time to the closest city in chapter 3, is a good proxy of teacher costs
and set wi/wj = 1.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of calibrated policy function
The policy function of the low-productivity school corresponds to the case of a school with a
current completion rate of 75% at a PTR of 40. The high-productivity school achieves the same
completion rate at a PTR of 80.
I also consider two alternative proxies of teacher costs: actual hardship
allowance payments and teacher retention rates. I find that also these
can only explain a small share of PTR variation. Figure 4.2 shows the
distribution of PTRs by hardship allowance category in Zambia. Teachers
working at schools categorized as rural receive a rural hardship allowance
that amounts to 20% of their basic salary. At so-called remote schools the
allowance is 25%. The figure illustrates that there is substantial variation
within each hardship allowance category and a regression of PTR on
hardship allowance category confirms that only 9.8% (adjusted R2) of
PTR variation can be explained by the allowance category3.
3Results for Mozambique are similar and available in the appendix. See figure D.1.
Data on hardship allowance payments for additional countries has not been obtained.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of PTRs by hardship allowance category in
Zambia
Data sources: Education Management Information System, Ministry of General Education,
Zambia (2014) and government payroll system, Public Service Management Division, Zambia
(2014).
The second alternative proxy, teacher retention rates, explains even
less of the overall PTR variation in Zambia as shown in figure 4.3. It can
only explain 1.3% (adjusted R2)4.
4Results for Uganda are similar and available in the appendix. See figure D.2. Data
on teacher retention rates for additional countries has not been obtained.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of PTRs by quartile of teacher retention rates in
Zambia
Data source: Education Management Information System, Ministry of General Education,
Zambia (2015).
4.2 Simulations
4.2.1 Model for simulations
The model resulting from the calibration described in the previous section
can be summarized as follows:
max
Ts
∑
s
Ps
∑j Pj
Hs(Ts)
subject to
Hs = 1−Φ
(
Φ−1(1− cs) + β
(
rs − PsTs
))
∑
s
Ts = T¯
Ts ≥ 1 ∀s
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This is the model used for simulation. The notation is the same as
in chapter 2. T¯ stands for the total number of teachers. Notice that the
model requires that every school is allocated at least one teacher.
4.2.2 Data for simulations
To simulate the effect of alternative teacher distributions on grade
promotion in public primary schools, I construct measures of grade
promotion for 20 countries. I do not observe grade promotion itself in
all countries. In some countries, I only observe the grade repetition rate
and in others only the pass rate at a national primary school exam. In
the former case, I assume dropout is zero and compute grade promotion
as one minus the grade repetition rate. In the latter case, I assume that
the grade promotion rate equals the exam pass rate. Table 4.1 gives an
overview of the data.
Table 4.1: Measure of grade promotion by country
Country Measure of grade promotion Missing data
Argentina Grade promotion rate <1%
Cambodia Grade promotion rate 6%
Cape Verde 1-grade repetition rate 7%
Chile Grade promotion rate <1%
Colombia Grade promotion rate 14%
Djibouti 1-grade repetition rate 0%
El Salvador Grade promotion rate 0%
Guinea-Bissau Grade promotion rate 0%
Honduras 1-grade repetition rate 0%
India National lower PSLE pass rate 34%
Laos 1-grade repetition rate 0%
Malawi Grade promotion rate <1%
Mozambique Grade promotion rate 3%
Peru Grade promotion rate 0%
Saint Lucia 1-grade repetition rate 0%
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Table 4.1: Measure of grade promotion by country
Country Measure of grade promotion Missing data
Saint Vincent 1-grade repetition rate 0%
Sweden National grade 6 examination pass rate 50%
Tanzania National PSLE pass rate 4%
UK (England) National grade 6 examination pass rate 14%
Zambia Grade promotion rate <1%
This table lists the measure of grade promotion used in each of the 20 simulation countries. PSLE stands for Primary School Leaving Examination.
The third column (missing data) indicates the share of public primary schools for which the measure was not available. Reasons for missing data
are country specific.
4.2.3 Smallest achievable maximum PTR rule
In many countries the allocation of teachers to schools is rule-based.
These rules can be internal guidelines of Ministries of Education or
formal laws. Typically they set a maximum school-level PTR that cannot
be exceeded at any school (e.g. Right to Education Act in India) or a
maximum class size (e.g. Malmonides’ rule in Israel).
In this subsection, I simulate the distribution of teachers under the
smallest achievable maximum PTR rule in each country. First, I compute
the smallest threshold x that can be satisfied given the current stock of
teachers and the distribution of enrolment across schools such that the
PTR does not exceed x at any school. Then, I distribute teachers based
on this allocation rule. Finally, I estimate the aggregate promotion gains
from this counterfactual distribution using the policy function displayed
in subsection 4.2.1.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the PTR as a function of enrolment under two
distinct maximum PTR rules. In the first case, the overall stock of teachers
is relatively large and the government can afford a maximum PTR of 25.
If such a rule is strictly implemented, PTRs will at most vary between
1 and 25, and variation is likely to be smaller unless some schools have
very low enollments. In the second case, the overall stock of teachers
is smaller and the government can only afford a maximum PTR of 50.
As the figure shows, PTRs will now vary between 1 and 50, and ceteris
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Figure 4.4: Maximum PTR rule under small and large teacher stock
paribus PTR variation will be larger than in the first case. It is evident that
PTR variation mechanically depends on the overall stock of teachers and
the school size (enrolment) distribution when a maximum PTR rule is
used to allocate teachers. In this case, PTR variation is larger in countries
with higher aggregate PTRs and smaller schools.
Figure 4.5 shows the actual and the counterfactual PTR distribution in
the four example countries. It can be observed that counterfactual PTR
variation is substantially smaller than actual variation in Mozambique
and India, but relatively close to actual variation in Peru and the UK. At
the same time, counterfactual variation is larger in the former two than
in the latter two countries. This pattern is borne out across all sample
countries as illustrated by the actual and counterfactual PTR standard
deviations displayed in figure 4.6.
Figure 4.7 shows the percentage point gains in grade promotion for all
20 countries in the simulation sample. Countries are sorted along the x-
axis by per capita income. While gains are small for countries with higher
incomes, they are much larger for many low- and lower-middle-income
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Figure 4.5: Actual and counterfactual PTR distribution under smallest
achievable maximum PTR rule
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Figure 4.6: PTR variation under smallest achievable maximum PTR rule
The scatter plot contains two points for each sample country, one indicating the actual PTR
standard deviation and one the counterfactual standard deviation under the smallest achievable
maximum PTR rule.
countries. In India they are close to 4pp and also in Cambodia and the
Sub-Saharan African countries in the sample, they are at least 1pp.
To benchmark these magnitudes I carry out two exercises. First, I ask
by how much the teacher workforce would have to be increased to achieve
equivalent gains if relative PTRs between schools were fixed. Table 4.2
shows how large these increases would have to be for all the countries
with significant promotion gains. They are substantial in all cases. So
are the associated costs that vary between 1% and 6% of total annual
government education expenditure.
Second, I ask how large the gains in educational attainment are that
are implied by the promotion gains. Any pupil not promoted to the next
grade can either repeat the grade or drop out. Using the Young Lives
survey5, I compute the correlation between grade repetition in primary
5The data used come from Young Lives, a 15-year study of the changing nature
of childhood poverty in Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam (www.younglives.org.uk).
Young Lives is funded by UK aid from the Department for International Development
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Figure 4.7: Promotion gains under smallest achievable maximum PTR
rule
Countries are sorted from left to right by GDP per capita.
Table 4.2: Cost of equivalent teacher workforce increases
Country ∆Promotion ∆Workforce Costs (USD) Costs (Gvt Edu Exp)
Cambodia 2.09pp 15.73% 43.5m/year 4.21%
Guinea-Bissau 1.25pp 8.64% 3.2m/year 5.58%
India 3.76pp 40.45% 18,170m/year 5.90%
Malawi 2.64pp 7.63% 33.8m/year 3.49%
Mozambique 1.42pp 5.92% 28.9m/year 1.33%
Tanzania 2.38pp 12.40% 191.5m/year 3.96%
Zambia 0.94pp 10.16% 139.4m/year 4.49%
∆Promotion indicates the gain in aggregate promotion induced by teacher reallocation according to the smallest achievable maximum PTR rule.
∆Workforce indicates the necessary increase in the teacher workforce to achieve an equivalent gain if relative PTRs between schools were fixed.
Columns 4 and 5 provide the costs associated with these increases in US dollars per year and as a share of the government education
expenditure. This is calculated using teacher wage data from various sources listed in table D.1 and government education expenditure data from
the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program Database.
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school and dropout in primary school and years of education at age 22 in
Ethiopia, India and Peru. Table 4.3 shows the results.
Table 4.3: Correlation with educational attainment
Country Grade repetition Dropout
Ethiopia 0.7 6.5
India 0.9 7.9
Peru 2.7 9.0
I divide pupils who are not promoted into repeaters and dropouts
based on the actual shares in each country and consider two scenarios.
For the first one I use the correlations estimated in Ethiopia, for the
second the ones estimated in India. Table 4.4 shows the gains in
educational attainment associated with promotion gains for all the
countries with significant promotion gains in the first scenario. Table 4.5
shows them for the second scenario. The results suggest that reallocation
would lead to an additional year of education for 1%-6% of children in
the considered countries6.
Table 4.4: Associated educational attainment gains - Scenario 1
Country ∆Promotion ∆Yrs Educ ∆Yrs/Child
Cambodia 2.09pp 143.9K 0.046
Guinea-Bissau 1.25pp 9.0K 0.020
India 3.76pp 9189.6K 0.036
Malawi 2.37pp 64.3K 0.014
Mozambique 1.42pp 255.1K 0.033
Tanzania 2.38pp 754.2K 0.051
Zambia 0.94pp 43.9K 0.010
(DFID). The views expressed here are those of the author. They are not necessarily those
of Young Lives, the University of Oxford, DFID or other funders.
6Data on child population between the age of 4 and 15 is from the UNESCO Institute
for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program Database
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Table 4.5: Associated educational attainment gains - Scenario 2
Country ∆Promotion ∆Yrs Educ ∆Yrs/Child
Cambodia 2.09pp 175.6K 0.056
Guinea-Bissau 1.25pp 11.0K 0.024
India 3.76pp 11216.2K 0.044
Malawi 2.37pp 89.0K 0.018
Mozambique 1.42pp 312.2K 0.040
Tanzania 2.38pp 920.3K 0.062
Zambia 0.94pp 54.4K 0.012
4.2.4 Optimal allocation
In this subsection, I ask how large gains from allocating teachers
optimally would be. I numerically solve the maximization problem
displayed in section 4.2.1 using a combination of direct search and
gradient-based tools. For computational reasons, I allow for divisibility
of teachers7. Figure 4.8 shows the actual and the optimal distribution of
PTRs in England and Mozambique. In the optimum, very unproductive
schools obtain only the minimum of one teacher. This leads to some
schools with extremely high PTRs in both countries. In addition to this,
it stands out that the optimal allocation implies less dispersion than is
actually observed. However, in Mozambique the optimal dispersion is
significantly larger than in the UK.
Figure 4.9 plots the gains from teacher reallocation. Gains from
implementing the optimal allocation are substantially larger than gains
from the simple maximum PTR rule discussed previously. Once again,
they are large in low- and lower-middle-income countries whereas they
are comparatively small in upper-middle- and high-income countries.
7Solving this high-dimensional optimization problem is computationally much more
demanding when adding an integer constraint for each school.
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Figure 4.8: Actual and optimal PTR distribution
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Figure 4.9: Promotion gains under optimal allocation
Countries are sorted from left to right by GDP per capita. Due to computational constraints
results for Colombia, India and Peru are not available.
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4.2.5 Optimal allocation within subnational units
The final counterfactual simulation only allows for teacher reallocation
within subnational units and asks how large promotion gains from
switching to an optimal allocation within these would be. In practice,
improving teacher allocation within smaller units may be more easily
feasible than a nationwide initiative. Given the large PTR variation within
subregions documented in chapter 3, such efforts are likely to go a long
way towards improving educational outcomes. For the purpose of this
simulation, I define subnational units such that geographic size is as
comparable as possible across countries. This means I use second-tier
administrative units in large countries such as India and Mozambique,
first-tier administrative units in mid-size countries such as Cambodia or
UK, and the entire country for small island nations such as Cape Verde
or Saint Lucia8.
Figure 4.10 shows the actual and the counterfactual distribution of
PTRs in Mozambique and the UK. The counterfactual dispersion is
smaller than the actual one, but only marginally so in England. Moreover,
in both countries it is larger than under the two previous counterfactuals.
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Figure 4.10: Actual and counterfactual PTR distribution under optimal
allocation within subnational units
8See table D.2 for details.
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The gains from reallocation are shown in figure 4.11. In all countries,
they are larger than gains from implementing the smallest achievable
maximum PTR rule. They are also somewhat smaller than gains
under the nationwide optimal allocation, but not by very much in most
countries, indeed suggesting optimal allocation within subnational units
could have large effects on aggregate education outcomes.
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Figure 4.11: Promotion gains under optimal allocation within subnational
units
Countries are sorted from left to right by GDP per capita. Due to computational constraints
results for India are not available.
4.3 Robustness
All three counterfactual simulations suggest that gains from teacher
reallocation in developing countries could be substantial. In this section,
I briefly examine the sensitivity of the presented results.
The magnitude of the estimated effects directly depends on the choice
of the parameter β. Gains are overestimated if the effect of PTR on grade
promotion is smaller than assumed. Figure 4.12 shows promotion gains
under the smallest achievable maximum PTR rule with β half as big as
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previously assumed. While gains are smaller, they are still significant
in the same countries as before. So, the conclusion that teachers are
misallocated in developing countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa does not hinge on the precise magnitude of the parameter β.
Indeed, figure 4.13 illustrates that gains would be substantially larger
if β was twice as large as previously assumed.
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Figure 4.12: Promotion gains under smallest achievable maximum PTR
rule - Small β
Countries are sorted from left to right by GDP per capita.
Gains are also overestimated if teacher costs are not equal across
schools, but instead positively correlated with PTRs. In this case, the total
number of teachers that could be employed under the smallest achievable
maximum PTR rule would be smaller than the current stock of teachers
(given a fixed budget for teacher compensation). Hence, the smallest
achievable maximum PTR would be larger than the one computed in
section 4.2.3, and aggregate promotion gains therefore smaller.
Finally, the effect of PTR on promotion may depend on school
characteristics and it is a priori ambiguous how this would affect the
estimated gains. For example, the marginal benefit from an additional
teacher at a well equipped school could either be larger or smaller than
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Figure 4.13: Promotion gains under smallest achievable maximum PTR
rule - Large β
Countries are sorted from left to right by GDP per capita.
at a poorly equipped school. Muralidharan and Sundaraman (2013)
show that the treatment effect of their RCT is heterogeneous by school
infrastructure9 and proximity to facilities1011. They find that effects are
larger for more remote and less well-equipped schools. I construct the
school infrastructure measure used by the authors for all public primary
schools in India using data from the Indian District Information System
for Education (2015) and show that school infrastructure is negatively
9Infrastructure is measured by an index summing six dummy variables that indicate
the existence of a brick building, a playground, a compound wall, a functioning source
of water, a functional toilet, and functioning electricity.
10Proximity to facilities is measured by an index summing eight variables (each coded
from 1-3) indicating proximity to a paved road, a bus stop, a public health clinic, a
private health clinic, public telephone, bank, post office, and the mandal educational
resource center. A higher value of the index indicates being further away from these
facilities.
11Notice that this is in line with misallocation of teachers across schools. If the effect
of adding a teacher was equal across schools, the marginal product would be equalized
and the current allocation could be optimal.
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correlated with PTRs12. This suggests that reallocation gains from
implementing the smallest achievable maximum PTR rule in India would
be even larger than estimated above because gains from adding teachers
to high-PTR schools would be larger than losses from withdrawing
teacher from low-PTR schools.
12A reduction in the infrastructure index by one is associated with a PTR increase by
1.9.
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Chapter 5
Causes: A case study from
Zambia
The distribution of teachers across public primary schools in Zambia is
representative of that in many developing countries. As figure 5.1 shows,
pupil-teacher ratios (PTRs) vary widely across public primary schools.
While the national aggregate PTR is 44.2, the bottom 10% of schools have
PTRs below 29.9 and the top 10% have PTRs above 101. Approximately
475,000 pupils, about 16% of the public primary school population, attend
schools with a PTR above 80. A large share of the variation in PTRs is
within districts. A decomposition of the PTR variance reveals that the
within-district variation (30.5) is far larger than the cross-district variation
(12.1) .
This chapter constitutes an investigation of the causes of PTR variation
in Zambia. It traces the disparities in staffing levels back to a set of
interlinked administrative issues. These include:
1. An ineffective teacher allocation policy
2. Non-compliant deployment and transfers
3. Payroll mismatch
4. Weaknesses in the budgeting process for teacher positions
These issues are dealt with in detail in following sections.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of PTRs across public primary schools in Zambia
DataSource: Education Management Information System (2017), Ministry of General
Education, Zambia.
5.1 Ineffective teacher allocation policy
The Standards and Evaluations Guidelines of the Zambian Ministry of
General Education posit that no school should have a PTR greater than
40. However, this rule is largely not followed, and 73% of public primary
schools have PTRs greater than the required maximum. At the same
time, 21% of schools have more teachers than the minimum number
required to meet this rule. Figure 5.2 shows schools’ current staffing levels
versus the minimum number of teachers that they would need to meet
the Ministry’s maximum PTR rule. As it indicates, while many schools
have less than the minimum prescribed number of teachers (below the 45◦
line), there are also many that have well over this minimum (above the
45◦ line). Many of these schools could have teachers transferred to schools
with fewer teachers than necessary and still have a PTR in line with the
government directive. However, even if excess teachers from these schools
were reallocated to schools in need of teachers, approximately 12,500 new
primary school teachers would have to be hired in addition to the existing
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stock of teachers in order to be able to meet the target of a maximum PTR
of 40 for all public primary schools.
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Figure 5.2: Actual versus prescribed number of teachers across public
primary schools
Data source: Education Management Information System (2017), Ministry of General
Education, Zambia. The grey line is a 45Aˆ◦ line.
5.2 Non-compliant deployment and transfers
The deployment of teachers does not appear to be particularly responsive
to current staffing needs. One would expect that more teachers are
deployed to areas with higher PTRs. But figure 5.3 shows that there is
very little correlation between the number of teachers a school would
need to achieve a PTR in line with the government’s mandate of 40 in 2013
and the number of new teachers deployed to that school in 2014. As the
figure indicates, most schools do not receive any new teachers. However,
the schools that do receive teachers are often not those in the most need.
In fact, many schools that already have more teachers than necessary to
achieve the PTR rule receive new teachers in deployment, rather than
those teachers being sent to understaffed schools. These schools, as well
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as those that previously had PTRs above 40 but receive more teachers
than necessary to achieve the PTR rule, are represented by red crosses in
the plot.
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Figure 5.3: Need for teachers and deployment of teachers in the following
year
Marker size indicates number of schools. Red crosses indicate cases where more teachers are
deployed than necessary to achieve a PTR of 40. Data source: Source: Education Management
Information System (2013-2014), Ministry of General Education, Zambia.
The teacher transfer process can also contribute to unbalanced staffing
patterns if transfers go from relatively understaffed to relatively over-
staffed schools. Analysis of teacher movement in EMIS between 2010 and
2016 indicates that while the majority (approximately 60%) of transfers
places a teacher into a school with a higher PTR than the one they
come from, a large share of transfers (approximately 40%) move teachers
into schools with lower PTRs than those they come from. Additionally,
approximately the same number of transfers occurs from schools with
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PTRs above 40 to schools with PTRs below 40 (19%) as the inverse (20%).
This suggests that overall transfers hardly contribute to equalizing PTRs.
Moreover, it raises the question why so many transfers from understaffed
schools to well-staffed schools occur. In principle, there are regulations
that limit the number of transfers and their impact on PTRs. Transfer
requests must be approved by senior officers, and the government has
imposed a minimum holding period at a new school before a teacher
can transfer. This holding period has recently been increased from two
to four years. However, even with the shorter minimum, it frequently
has not been respected. As figure 5.4 indicates, over half of the teachers
that transferred at some point between 2010 and 2016 did so before two
years had elapsed, and nearly 90% did so before four years . Anecdotal
evidence suggests a number of causes for this including health issues
that are sometimes exaggerated, teachers obtaining transfers to be with
spouses, and teachers using social and political connections to obtain
transfers to preferred locations.
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of holding periods (completed years) among
teachers who transferred between 2010 and 2016
Data source: Source: Education Management Information System (2010-2016), Ministry of
General Education, Zambia.
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5.3 Payroll mismatch
Transfers that are not in compliance with official guidelines are also
likely to contribute to significant levels of payroll mismatch, another
major administrative obstacle to teacher allocation. Payroll mismatch
occurs when staff does not work at the organizational unit they are listed
at in the government payroll system (their paypoint). Quantifying the
exact magnitude of payroll mismatch in the education sector is difficult,
however several studies have provided similar estimates. In a 2014 report
on a sample of 88 schools in four provinces, the Office of the Auditor
General (OAG) found that up to 60% of teachers do not work at the
location where they are paid. A 2016 survey of 158 rural schools I
conducted myself placed this number at 40%. Analysis of 2017 staff
returns from two provinces in which district officials indicate the working
location and paypoint of each teacher reveals a payroll mismatch range
between 43% and 77% across districts.
Payroll mismatch is a major problem with regards to the allocation
of teachers because a school may be understaffed while payroll does
not show any vacancies for the school. In this case, some of the
teachers on the school’s payroll presumably work at other schools (or
not at all). Figure 5.5 illustrates this problem. It plots the number
of teachers reported in the payroll system versus the actual number of
teachers as reported in the Education Management Information System
(EMIS) in 2014 for each public primary school. If there was no payroll
mismatch, the points would all lie on the grey 45◦ line. But as the graph
shows, many schools (30%) have more teachers in EMIS than on their
payroll (indicating overstaffing relative to payroll), and an even larger
number (61%) have more teachers on payroll than in EMIS (indicating
understaffing relative to payroll). Most teachers working at schools where
EMIS teacher counts exceed the number of paypoints are likely occupying
paypoints at understaffed schools, thus impeding adequate deployment
of teachers to these schools.
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Figure 5.5: Number of paypoints and teachers by school
Data sources: Education Management Information System (2014), Ministry of General
Education, Zambia, and government payroll system (2014), Public Service Management
Division, Zambia. Figure based on 5,293 schools that could be matched between EMIS and
the payroll system by school name, 87% of schools in the payroll system.
5.4 Weaknesses in the budgeting process
The prevalence of payroll mismatch means that there are substantial
discrepancies between teachers’ assigned placements and their actual
working locations. However, this does not mean that eliminating payroll
mismatch would eliminate the observed variation in staffing levels across
schools. In fact, even if actual staffing levels perfectly followed payroll,
PTRs would still vary substantially across schools. Figure 5.6 illustrates
this by comparing the distribution of actual PTRs across public primary
schools to the distribution of pupil-teacher paypoint ratios (henceforth
sanctioned PTRs) across the same schools. The figure shows that there is
not only significant variation in actual PTRs, but also in sanctioned PTRs.
40% of schools have sanctioned PTRs above 40 and 60% of schools have
sanctioned PTRs below 40.
One of the main factors behind the dispersion in sanctioned PTRs
appears to be that establishment registers determining the human re-
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Figure 5.6: Actual and sanctioned distribution of PTRs across public
primary schools in 2014
Data sources: Education Management Information System (2014), Ministry of General
Education, Zambia, and government payroll system (2014), Public Service Management
Division, Zambia. Actual PTRs are derived from EMIS 2014 and sanctioned PTRs are computed
based on 2014 payroll data. Sanctioned PTRs are defined as pupil-teacher paypoint ratios.
source budget of each school position by position are rarely updated.
Establishment registers determine the human resource budget of each
school position by position. However, once a school has been opened,
its establishment is rarely adjusted to reflect changes in enrollment over
time. Between 2012 and 2016, only 10% of schools had any update,
and only 8% had an update that added teachers. It is also unclear how
closely establishment updates reflect changes in enrolment. While schools
that gained teachers did have larger increases in enrolment than schools
without a change in their establishment, 90% of schools with an increase
in enrolment did not see an increase in their establishment and 47% of
schools that gained teaching positions saw decreases in enrolment.
Additionally, newly opened schools can take a long time to receive an
establishment. Schools are frequently opened before funds are officially
allocated towards fully staffing it. Even when funds are available, the
process to approve an establishment is complex. Approval is needed
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at multiple levels of the Ministry of Education, the Public Service
Management Division, and the Ministry of Finance, which opens many
opportunities for the process to stall. It is difficult to estimate how
many schools are functioning without an establishment, but collaborative
fieldwork with the Human Resource Department of the Ministry of
Education and the Zambia Education Sector Support Technical Assistance
(ZESSTA) in one district of Zambia found that 38% of schools did not
have an establishment. Notice that figure 5.6 does not take any facilities
without establishment registers into account as they are not observed in
payroll. Therefore, the true dispersion in sanctioned PTRs is even larger
than shown in the figure.
Missing and outdated establishment registers are not only a problem
for teacher allocation in and of themselves, but they also cause pay-
roll mismatch and thus additionally affect teacher allocation indirectly
through this channel. This is because district education offices need to
send teachers from schools with establishment registers to schools that do
not have sufficient, or any, paypoints in order to guarantee the operation
of these schools.
5.5 Discussion
In chapter 3, it was shown that school remoteness can only explain a
small share of overall variation in PTRs across public primary schools
in developing countries. This chapter suggests that instead lack of
managerial capacity and weak enforcement of existing policies are key
drivers of PTR variation, at least in the case of Zambia.
Research and government reports from other developing countries
paint a similar picture. For example, Diompy (2014) describes how
favoritism plays an important role in teacher allocation decisions in
Senegal and criticizes the lack of clear transfer policies. Cummings
and Tahirou (2016) find that in Niger, ”there is a lack of regulations,
accountability mechanisms and sanctions governing the distribution of
teachers”. Ramachandran et al. (2018) describe a patronage-based teacher
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allocation system in India where politicians and bureaucrats transfer
teachers for political motives regardless of school need. Similarly, Asim
et al. (2017) document how in Malawi ”teachers leverage informal
networks and political patronage to resist placement in remote schools,
while administrative officials are unable to stand up to these formal and
informal pressures, in part because of a lack of reliable databases and
objective criteria for the allocation of teachers”. Weaknesses in allocation
management are also reported by governments themselves. For example,
Cameroon’s strategic education sector plan states that ”imprecise man-
agement, in particular with regards to the allocation of teachers across
schools, results in both an efficiency and an equity problem” (Ministere
de l’economie, de la planification, et de laˆamenagement du territoire,
Republique du Cameroun 2013). A recent strategic document from the
government of Bangladesh announces a ”major shift (...) to a demand or
need-based deployment of resources, including teachers” and emphasizes
that ”clear criteria will be applied to determine the actual need for new
teachers on a school-by-school basis” (Ministry of Primary and Mass
Education, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 2015).
The described causes of PTR variation are unlikely to be confined to
the education sector. In developing countries, lack of managerial capacity
and enforcement problems are likely to be present across different
ministries. Hence, the uncovered human resource allocation problem is
likely to extend to other public sectors, such as health, law enforcement
and administration. The next chapter takes a look at the distribution of
health workers.
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Chapter 6
Human resource misallocation in
other public sectors? Evidence
from the staffing of Zambian and
English primary care facilities
Many developing countries suffer from a lack of health resources.
Health staff shortages are an area of particular concern. The WHO
recommends a minimum of 4.45 doctors, nurses, and midwives per
1000 population (Scheffler et al. 2018). Figure 6.1 shows aggregate
staffing levels per 1000 population relative to this benchmark across
countries by per capita income. The overall lack of health workers
in low- and middle-income countries is appalling. Nonetheless, some
have claimed that ”imbalances of health workers are a bigger issue than
national deficiencies” (Lemiere et al. 2013) in developing countries,
thereby hinting at severe inefficiencies in human resource allocation in the
health sector. Empirical evidence on the distribution of health workers,
however, is scarce and confined to analyses at the level of subnational
administrative units1.
This chapter sets out to compare the distribution of health workers
in Zambia and England at the micro-level, i.e. the health facility level.
1See Appiah-Denkyira et al. (2013), Dussault and Franceschini (2006), Ferrinho et al.
(2011), Lemiere et al. (2011), and Munga and Maestad (2009) for available evidence.
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Figure 6.1: Doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1000 population across
countries by income
Health worker density data is from the WHO’s Global Health Workforce Statistics. Numbers
are the most recent available for each country. Per capita income data is from the World Bank
International Comparison Program database. The dashed horizontal line indicates the WHO
recommendation of 4.45 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1000 population.
Capturing staffing variation within subnational units is important for two
reasons. First, a substantial share of cross-facility staffing variation may
be within subnational units, as shown for the education sector in chapter
3. In this case, analyses that compare aggregate staffing levels between
subnational units seriously underestimate staffing imbalances. Second,
capturing local variation is also important because local understaffing
could have large negative externalities as it may limit the capacity to
contain disease outbreaks locally. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
is a recent reminder of the magnitude such externalities can take on2.
I propose a general approach to describe the spatial distribution of
health workers relative to population which is applicable across countries
2See Panjabi (2016) for more information.
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of all income levels as long as data on facility locations and facility staffing
exists. While the presented approach can be employed across all health
care sectors, the focus of this chapter is on public primary care and
therefore only medical staff at public primary care units is taken into
account. Distributional patterns in England serve as a reference for those
in Zambia.
A key challenge to documenting the relative distribution of health
workers in developing countries at the micro-level is estimating catch-
ment populations of health facilities. Corresponding data is frequently
not available and when available, often of uncertain quality. I propose two
estimation methods and assess their performance through comparison
with official catchment population headcounts for subsets of facilities
where such data is available. Both estimation methods rely on high-
resolution population data from the Gridded Population of the World3
which reports population estimates at the level of approximately one-
by-one kilometer grid cells for all countries. The two methods differ
in the way grid cells are assigned to facilities. Each cell is assigned
to the closest facility, but closeness of facilities is firstly measured by
straight-line distance and secondly by travel time. Both methods explain
about one fourth of the cross-facility variation in catchment population
headcounts in England and one tenth of it in Zambia. Estimates based
on travel time slightly outperform those based on straight-line distance in
both countries. Lower data quality in Zambia is likely to account for the
lower explanatory power of both of the methods in Zambia compared to
England.
Independent from the source of facility catchment population, whether
taken from official headcounts or estimated as described, I find large
variation in access to health workers across the population in Zambia.
The distribution is marked by a long right tail of people living in
areas with high population-health-worker ratios (PHRs). In contrast, in
England PHRs vary little and there is hardly any right tail. Modal PHRs,
however, are similar in both countries. A spatial decomposition of the
3See http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v4 for details.
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variation in relative staffing across facilities reveals that a large share of
the variation in Zambia is within districts. Finally, regressions of PHR on
measures of facility remoteness show that only a small share of overall
staffing variation can be explained by remoteness. All these findings
mirror facts 1 and 2 presented for the education sector in chapter 3, thus
suggesting that human resource allocation could be equally inefficient in
the health sector of developing countries.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in
this chapter. In section 3, the two different methods to estimate catchment
populations are discussed. Section 4 presents the results and section 5
discusses them.
6.1 Background and data
6.1.1 Zambian primary care facilities
Several administrative data sets on Zambian health facilities were com-
bined to build a comprehensive database that includes the location and
staffing for the universe of primary care facilities in the country. For
this purpose primary care units were defined as health posts and health
centres. These two types of facilities represent the bottom two tiers of
the five-tier Zambian health system. The excluded top three tiers are
comprised of hospitals of different levels of specialization.
In 2017, EQUIP Zambia conducted a census of all health facilities
in the country. This census provides the most complete listing of
health facilities in Zambia and contains GPS coordinates for all facilities.
However, there is a small number of primary care facilities (172) that
EQUIP did not manage to visit for logistical reasons. Coordinates for 94
of these could be recovered from the 2007 JICA health facility census. In
the end, only 78 primary care facilities remained without coordinates and
will not be taken into account below as location information is essential
for the analysis. The total number of primary care facilities considered
below amounts to 2490.
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In addition to facility location information, the EQUIP census also col-
lected official catchment population headcounts for a subset of primary
care facilities (68%). This data is used for comparison with estimated
catchment populations. Official headcounts are conducted by facility staff
and are supposed to include all inhabitants in the official catchment area
of a facility. Official catchment areas are typically composed of a number
of settlements assigned to a facility, however it is unclear to what extent
these overlap with actual catchment areas as patients are not restricted
in their facility choice and settlements need not be part of any official
catchment area4.
Facility staffing data comes from the Ministry of Health’s Human
Resource Information System (HRIS). The data used is from January 2018.
HRIS is restricted to public health workers and therefore, it does not
contain information on the staffing of private facilities. However, only
4.9% of primary care facilities in Zambia are private. HRIS staffing data
was matched to facility data by facility name. This way staffing data
was successfully merged to 74% of primary care facilities. Unmatched
public facilities are mainly due to missing facility names in HRIS in
certain districts. In the following analysis, all facilities with and without
matched staffing data are taken into consideration for the construction of
catchment areas.
6.1.2 English primary care facilities
For the purpose of this paper and for comparability with Zambia, I define
primary care units in England as General Practitioner (GP) practices5. In
England, every resident is eligible for free primary care services through
the National Health System (NHS) and needs to register with a GP
practice for this purpose. At any one point in time, a resident cannot
be registered at more than one GP practice and the choice of GP practices
4Detailed information on the assignment of settlements only exists at a decentralized
level and could not be obtained for this study.
5Note that this definition excludes certain primary care providers such as dentists,
opticians, and pharmacists.
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they can register at is restricted by the location of residence. Only
residents within a GP’s practice area are entitled to register. This means
that residents can only choose between a small number of GP practices.
While it is not mandatory to register with a GP, nearly every resident is
registered. In fact, in 2015 the total number of registered patients with
NHS exceeded official population estimates from the Office for National
Statistics6. In this chapter, the number of patients registered with each
practice is used as the official catchment population.
Data on the location (GPS coordinates), staffing and registered pa-
tients of all GP practices in England is published by NHS Choices
and data from 2014 was downloaded from the UK government’s open
data portal7. While location and staffing data are provided at the GP
branch level, registered patients are only available at the GP practice
level. Overall the data contains 9,847 GP branches belonging to 8,157
GP practices and location information is available for 96.7% of branches.
As in the case of Zambia, facilities without location information cannot
be considered in the subsequent analysis. In the following section,
catchment areas are constructed at the branch level, but catchment
populations are aggregated at the practice level in order to allow for
comparison with the number of registered patients at each practice.
6.1.3 Complementary data
Population
The Gridded Population of the World (Version 4) from Columbia Uni-
versity is the primary source of high-resolution population estimates for
this paper8. It provides population estimates within 30 arc-second grid
cells (approximately 0.8km2 throughout Zambia and 0.5km2 throughout
6See Baker (2016) for details.
7See https://data.gov.uk/. Data was downloaded on 09/02/2017.
8WorldPop from the University of Southampton was considered as an alternative
source of high-resolution population data for Zambia. As it does not cover England,
however, it could not be used for comparative analysis. Results for Zambia based on
WorldPop are available upon request.
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England). Its main input is national census data. Population from
the smallest available administrative area (constituencies in Zambia and
output areas in England) is assumed to be evenly distributed within these
areas, with adjustments made for borders and landforms such as bodies
of water9.
Travel time
Based on geographic and road data from Google and OpenStreetMap,
the Malaria Access Project (MAP) at Oxford University has produced a
data set dividing the world into grid cells of the same size as the Gridded
Population of the World indicating the difficulty to travel through each
grid cell10. This data is used to determine which facility can be reached
in the shortest time from each population grid cell.
6.2 Estimation of catchment populations
I use two different approaches to estimate catchment populations and
compare results to official estimates. Official estimates are based on
headcounts by facility staff in Zambia and the number of registered
patients in England. While the latter is available for the universe of GP
practices in England, the former is only available for 68% of primary care
facilities in Zambia.
The first approach assigns each population grid cell to the closest
facility based on the straight-line distance between the centre point of
the grid cell and the facility. The second approach assigns grid cells
to facilities based on shortest travel time as determined by the MAP
data previously described11 In both cases, the catchment population of
a given facility is computed as the sum of population over all cells in
9See http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v4 for details.
10See Weiss et al. (2018) and https://map.ox.ac.uk/research-project/accessibility -
to cities/ for details.
11When multiple facilities fall into the same MAP cell, catchment populations
are evenly distributed between them. Results are robust to distributing catchment
populations proportional to facility staffing between facilities in these cases instead.
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the facility’s catchment area12. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the similarities
and differences between these two approaches in Zambia. While the
straight-line approach yields fairly regular polygons (6.2(a)), travel time-
based catchment areas conform more closely with natural boundaries,
and extend along major roads (6.2(b)). Overall, 30% of Zambia’s and the
UK’s area and 31% and 32% of their respective populations lie in different
catchment areas when using one method instead of the other.
(a) Straight-line distance (b) Travel time
Figure 6.2: Health facility catchment areas in Northern Zambia by
construction method
Dots indicate primary care facilities. Catchment areas represented by different underlying colors.
Grey lines are roads and blue lines are bodies of water.
Figure 6.3 shows the correlation between derived catchment popula-
tion estimates and official numbers for all facilities where the latter are
available. Independent from the estimation method, estimated catchment
populations are positively correlated with facility headcounts. In England
the correlation between official and estimated catchment populations is
stronger than in Zambia. In Zambia only 9-12% in the variation of
official catchment populations can be explained by the estimates whereas
in England 23-26% are explained. In both countries, travel-time based
catchment population estimates slightly outperform straight-line distance
based ones. Although the derived catchment population estimates only
explain a limited share of the variation in facility headcounts, they
12Note that GPs in England may have several branches. In such cases, the catchment
population for each branch is determined first. Then a GP’s catchment population is
computed as the sum of catchment populations over all branches.
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are helpful because they allow for the inclusion of facilities without
headcounts into subsequent analyses.
In principle, there are two reasons why estimates may differ from
headcounts. First, official facility catchment areas may not correspond
to estimated catchment areas and headcounts are limited to official
catchment areas. Without a map of the official catchment areas, it is
unfortunately not possible to assess this. Second, even if catchment
areas were identical, estimates of their population would likely differ
between the different considered sources due to their fundamentally
different approaches to population estimation. The lower explanatory
power of both methods in Zambia is likely due to lower data quality.
Gridded Population of the World data is based on census data for larger
administrative units in Zambia (constituencies - third-tier administrative
division) than in England (output areas - sixth-tier administrative divi-
sion). Additionally, registered patient numbers in England are likely to
be more reliable than facility headcounts in Zambia, and travel time data
is likely to be more accurate for England as well (due to higher accuracy
and completeness of both Google and OpenStreetMap). Finally, higher
internal migration and higher population growth in Zambia may also
be reasons for the lower explanatory power. This is because the census
data underlying the Gridded Population of the World data for Zambia
and England is from 2010 and 2011, respectively, while official catchment
population estimates are from 2017 and 2014, respectively.
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of catchment population estimates across
methods and countries
Official estimates in Zambia are defined as facility headcounts as reported by facility
staff in the 2017 EQUIP health facility census. In England, official estimates refer to the
numbers of registered patients. Samples are limited to facilities where official estimates
are available. Dashed lines are the 45-degree lines. Blue lines indicate linear regression
lines. 156 and 186 facilities are outside the range of the plots and in Zambia and England,
respectively.
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6.3 Results
Figure 6.4(a) plots the distribution of PHRs across primary care facilities
in Zambia. Facilities are weighted by their catchment population and
the sample is restricted to facilities with GPS coordinates, catchment
population headcounts, and staffing information. It comprises 1420 out
of 2490 primary care facilities in Zambia providing care for 12 million
people out of a total population of 16.59 million13. A distribution plot that
also contains facilities without catchment population headcounts can be
found in the appendix (see figure E.1). Results are very similar. The black
line shows the distribution based on facility headcounts of catchment
populations and the grey lines indicate the corresponding distributions
based on estimated catchment populations. Independent from the source
of catchment population estimates, a large variation of relative staffing
across the population is observed. The long right tail of the distribution
stands out. Based on official estimates, 10% of the population live in areas
where the PHR is below 850. At the other extreme, 10% of the population
live in areas where this ratio exceeds 8133. On average, the PHR is 3695.
The picture is very different in England. Figure 6.4(b) shows that there
is hardly any right tail and PHRs vary much less across the population.
Not surprisingly, the average PHR is also much lower. The mean ratio is
1238, and the 10th and 90th percentile are 564 and 2012, respectively.
So far, health workers have been defined as all medical staff at
the included facilities14. Staffing imbalances in Zambia are even more
extreme when restricting the focus to high-skilled medical staff. As figure
6.5(a) shows, the distribution of the ratio of population to doctors, nurses,
and midwives has a slightly thicker tail. The ratio of the 90th and the 50th
percentile of the distribution amounts to 3.3 while it was only 3.0 under
13Source: World Bank 2016.
14In line with the WHO’s Global Observatory data medical staff includes nursing and
midwifery personnel, dentistry personnel, pharmaceutical personnel, laboratory health
workers, medical assistants, community and traditional health workers, biomedical
engineers, surgical workforce and skilled health personnel.
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of PHRs across primary care facilities
Official estimates in Zambia are defined as facility headcounts as reported by facility
staff in the 2017 EQUIP health facility census. In England, official estimates refer
to the numbers of registered patients. Samples are restricted to facilities where official
estimates are available. Health workers include all medical staff. Facilities are weighted
by catchment population.
the more general definition of health workers15. Figure 6.5(b) reveals that
the distribution for England hardly differs from the one in the previous
figure 6.4(b). Indeed, the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile is almost
identical16. This is largely because unlike in Zambia, in England most
medical staff is high-skilled.
Interestingly, mapping the access to health workers across space
reveals a lot of local variation in staffing across facilities in Zambia. Figure
6.6(a) shows a heat map of PHRs in Zambia. The area around each facility
is colored according to the facility PHR. Shades of green indicate low
PHRs and shades of red high PHRs. District borders are drawn as black
lines. The map is very spotty and within most districts a relatively wide
15Since figure 6.5(a) does not include facilities without any high-skilled medical staff
(because their PHR is infinity), this is actually an underestimate of the increase in the
thickness of the right tail.
16The ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile in Engalnd amounts to 1.9 considering
all medical staff and 1.8 considering only high-skilled staff.)
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Figure 6.5: Distribution of population per high-skilled health worker
across primary care facilities
Official catchment population estimates in Zambia are defined as facility headcounts as
reported by facility staff in the 2017 EQUIP health facility census. In England, official
catchment population estimates refer to the numbers of registered patients. Samples are
restricted to facilities where official estimates are available. High-skilled health workers
are defined as doctors, nurses, and midwives. Facilities are weighted by catchment
population.
color spectrum is observed. A spatial decomposition of the cross-facility
variance in PHRs in Zambia confirms this impression. The within-district
standard deviation is 4595 whereas the cross-district standard deviation
is only 2046. In England, on the contrary, staffing is much more balanced
across space as already shown. Figure 6.6(b) confirms this once again.
Similarly in line with the findings from chapter 3, variation in facility
remoteness can only explain a small share of the overall variation in
staffing. Figure 6.7 shows that within each quartile of facility remoteness,
as measured by population density (GPW v4) within a circle of 3km
radius around the facility, there is a lot variation in PHRs17.
17Results are vary similar when using alternative measures of facility remoteness. See
figures E.2 and E.3
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Figure 6.6: Heat maps of PHRs
Samples are restricted to facilities where official catchment population estimates are
available. Health workers include all medical staff. Black lines indicate district and
county borders, respectively.
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Figure 6.7: PHR distribution by quartile of population density in Zambia
Population density is measured as the density within a circle of 3km radius around a health
facility based on data from the Gridded Population of the World (v4).
6.4 Discussion
The distributional patterns of health workers across public primary
care facilities in Zambia and England are similar to those of teachers
across public primary schools in developing and developed countries.
While variation in PHRs across facilities is large in Zambia, there is
little variation in England. Additionally, only a small share of the
PHR variation in Zambia can be explained by facility remoteness. This
suggests that not only misallocation of teachers, but also misallocation of
health workers could be a serious issue in developing countries.
It remains a question for future research whether the results from
Zambia can be generalized to other developing countries and to what
extent the observed PHR variation is indeed indicative of health worker
misallocation. Given the overall lack of health resources in developing
countries and the large share of the health care budget that is typically
spent on health worker salaries in these countries, the importance of this
question cannot be overstated.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis constitutes a comparative analysis of the distribution of
teachers across public primary schools in 86 countries. I build a new
global data set comprising the universe of public primary schools in 70
countries, and subsamples in 16 countries. In line with existing evidence,
I show that average PTRs in public primary schools are negatively
correlated with per capita income across countries. Additionally, I present
three new stylized facts consistent with teacher misallocation across
schools. First, I document that the within-country variation in PTRs
is higher in lower income countries. This negative correlation between
PTR variation and per capita income is also found within countries over
time. Second, I show in cross-country regressions and cross-district
regressions that aggregate educational attainment and PTR variation are
negatively correlated aˆ even after controlling for differences in per capita
income, population, and aggregate PTR. Third, I find that only a small
share of PTR variation within developing countries can be explained
by differences in school remoteness, as measured by population density,
nighttime luminosity, or travel time to the closest city.
In order to assess to what extent teachers are misallocated in de-
veloping countries, I develop a theoretical model and calibrate it. In
simulations of three different counterfactual teacher distributions I find
that aggregate grade promotion gains from teacher reallocation would be
substantial in many developing countries. For example, implementing
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a simple rule-based teacher allocation system that restricts PTRs by an
achievable upper bound would increase promotion rates by 1 percentage
point in Zambia and up to 4 percentage points in India. This corresponds
to an additional year of education for 1% of primary school-aged children
in Zambia and 4% in India. With 61% of children between the ages 5
and 14 worldwide living in low- and lower-middle-income countries1,
the implications of these findings are far-reaching.
They also raise the question why teachers are suboptimally dis-
tributed. In a case study in collaboration with the Zambian Ministry
of General Education I show that lack of managerial capacity and weak
enforcement are key factors. Evidence from other countries points in
the same direction. Hence, the presented findings call for investment in
managerial capacity and enforcement mechanisms in the public sector of
developing countries. This is particularly the case because other sectors
than education are likely to be similarly plagued by human resource
misallocation. A comparison of the health worker distribution across
public primary care facilities in Zambia and England reveals similar
patterns as those observed for teachers across public primary schools,
thus suggesting that the findings from this thesis apply beyond the
education sector.
1Figure based on 2015 data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank
International Comparison Program Database
97
References
Agarwal, Siddhant; Kayina, Athisii; Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop; Reddy,
Anugula. 2016. Redistributing Teachers using Local Transfers. ISI
Discussion Paper 16-08. Delhi: Indian Statistical Institute.
Akhtari M.; Moreira D.; Trucco L. 2017. Political Turnover, Bureaucratic
Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services. Working Paper.
Angrist, Joshua D.; Lavy, Victor. 1999 Using Maimonides’ Rule to
Estimate the Effect of Class Size on Scholastic Achievement. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2), 533-575.
Angrist, Joshua D. ; Lavy, Victor; Leder-Luis, Jetson; Shany, Adi. 2017.
Maimonides Rule Redux. NBER Working Paper No. 23486.
Appiah-Denkyira, Ebenezer; Herbst, Christopher H.; Soucat, Agnes;
Lemiere, Christophe; Saleh, Karima. 2013. Towards Interventions in
Human Resources for Health in Ghana : Evidence for Health Workforce
Planning and Results. Directions in Development–Human Development.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Lee, Scott. 2018. Losing Prosociality in
the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery
of Public Services. Working Paper.
98
Asim, Salman; Chimombo, Joseph P. G.; Chugunov, Dmitry; Gera,
Ravinder Madron Casley. 2017. Moving teachers to Malawi’s remote
communities: a data-driven approach to teacher deployment (English).
Policy Research Working Paper Series 8253. Washington, DC: World Bank
Group.
Baker, Carl. 2016. Population estimates & GP registers: why the differ-
ence. House of Commons Library. Retrieved from https://commonslibrary.
parliament.uk/social-policy/health/population-estimates-gp-registers-why-the-
difference/ on 13/07/2018.
Bandiera, O.; Larcinese, V.; Rasul, I. 2010. Heterogeneous Class Size
Effects: New Evidence from a Panel of University Students. The
Economic Journal 120, 1365-1398.
Banerjee, A.; Deaton, A.; Duflo, E. 2004. Health care delivery in rural
Rajasthan. Poverty Action Lab working paper No. 4.
Barrios, Andres; Bovini, Giulia. 2017. It’s Time to Learn: Understanding
the Differences in Returns to Instruction Time. Working paper.
Beteille, T. 2009. Absenteeism, Transfers and Patronage: The Political
Economy of Teacher Labour Markets in India. PhD thesis, Stanford
University.
Bold, Tessa; Filmer, Deon P.; Martin, Gayle; Molina, Ezequiel; Rockmore,
Christophe; Stacy, Brian William; Svensson, Jakob; Wane, Waly. 2017.
What do teachers know and do? Does it matter? Evidence from
primary schools in Africa. Policy Research Working Paper Series 7956.
Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
Busso, M.; Madrigal, L.; Pages, C. 2013. Productivity and resource
misallocation in Latin America. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics
99
13(1), 903-932.
Chaudhury, N.; Hammer, J.; Kremer, M.; Muralidharan, K.; Halsey
Rogers, F. 2006. Missing in action: Teacher and health worker absence
in developing countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (1), 91-116.
Checchi, Daniele; De Paola, Maria. 2017. The Effect of Multigrade Classes
on Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills: Causal Evidence Exploiting
Minimum Class Size Rules in Italy. IZA DP No. 11211. Bonn: Institute of
Labor Economics.
Chin, Aimee. 2005. Can redistributing teachers across schools raise
educational attainment? Evidence from Operation Blackboard in India.
Journal of Development Economics 78 (2), 384-405.
Cummings, Clare and Tahirou, Ali Bako M. 2016. Collective action and
the deployment of teachers in Niger: a political economy analysis. ODI
briefing. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Dal Bo, Ernesto; Finan, Frederico; Rossi, Martin A. 2013. Strengthening
State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public
Service. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (3), 1169-1218.
Das, J.; Hammer, J. 2007. Money for nothing: The dire straits of medical
practice in Delhi, India. Journal of Development Economics 83 (1), 1-36.
Das, Jishnu; Hammer, Jeffrey; Leonard, Kenneth. 2008. The Quality
of Medical Advice in Low-Income Countries. Policy Research Working
Paper No. 4501. Washington, DC: World Bank.
De Ree, Joppe; Muralidharan, Karthik; Pradhan, Menno; Rogers, Halsey.
2018. Double for Nothing? Experimental Evidence on an Unconditional
Teacher Salary Increase in Indonesia. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
100
133 (2), 993-1039.
Diompy, Danty Patrick. 2014. De la mobilite de carrieres du personnel
enseignant dans le moyen secondaire au Senegal : perceptions des
acteurs. Master thesis. Universite Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar, Faculte
des Sciences et Technologies, de l’Education et de la Formation.
Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael. 2015. School
governance, teacher incentives, and pupil-teacher ratios: Experimental
evidence from Kenyan primary schools. Journal of Public Economics
(123), 92-110.
Duflo, Esther; Hanna, Rema; Ryan, Stephen P. 2012. Incentives Work:
Getting Teachers to Come to School. The American Economic Review
102 (4), 1241-1278.
Dussault, G., and Franceschini, M. C. 2006. Not Enough There, Too Many
Here: Understanding Geographical Imbalances in the Distribution of the
Health Workforce. Human Resources for Health 4 (12).
Fagernas, Sonja and Pelkonen, Panu. 2012. Preferences and skills of
Indian public sector teachers. IZA Journal of Labor & Development, 1 (3).
Fagernas, Sonja and Pelkonen, Panu. 2017. Where’s the Teacher? How
Teacher Workplace Segregation Impedes Teacher Allocation in India. IZA
DP No. 10595. Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics.
Ferrinho, P.; Siziya, S.; Goma, F.; Dussault, G. 2011. The Human Resource
for Health Situation in Zambia: Deficit and Maldistribution. Human
Resources for Health 9 (30).
Franck, R.; Rainer, I. 2012. Does the Leader’s Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic
Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa. American
101
Political Science Review 106(2), 294-325.
Glewwe, P.; Kremer, M.; Moulin, S.; Zitzewitz, E. 2004. Retrospective vs.
prospective analyses of school inputs: the case of flip charts in Kenya.
Journal of Development Economics 74 (1), 251-268.
Glewwe, Paul; Muralidharan, Karthik. 2016. Improving Education
Outcomes in Developing Countries: Evidence, Knowledge Gaps, and
Policy Implications. Handbook of the Economics of Education 5, 653-
743.
Hedges, John. 2002. The importance of posting and interaction with the
education bureaucracy in becoming a teacher in Ghana. International
Journal of Educational Development 22 (3-4), 353-366.
Hoxby, Caroline M. 2000. The Effects of Class Size on Student Achieve-
ment: New Evidence from Population Variation. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115 (4), 1239-1285.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai; Klenow, Peter J. 2009. Misallocation and Manufactur-
ing TFP in China and India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4),
1403-1448.
IIEP- Pole de Dakar. 2016. More effective teacher allocation in Africa.
Polemag - IIEP Pole de Dakar Information Magazine 24, 8-13.
Jacob, Verghese; Kochar, Anjini; Reddy, Suresh. 2008. School Size
and Schooling Inequalities. Stanford Center on Global Poverty and
Development Working Paper 354.
Kramon, Eric; Posner, Daniel N. 2016. Ethnic Favoritism in Education in
Kenya. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 11 (1), 1-58.
102
Krueger, Alan B. 1999. Experimental Estimates of Education Production
Functions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2), 497-532.
Lavy, Victor. 2015. Do Differences in Schools’ Instruction Time Explain
International Achievement Gaps? Evidence from Developed and Devel-
oping Countries. The Economic Journal 125 (588), F397-F424.
Lemiere, Christophe; Herbst, Christopher H.; Dolea, Carmen; Zurn,
Pascal; Soucat, Agnes. 2013. Rural-Urban Imbalance of Health Workers in
Sub-Saharan Africa. In ”The Labor Market for Health Workers in Africa:
A New Look at the Crisis”. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Lemiere, Christophe; Herbst, Christopher H.; Jahanshahi, Negda; Smith,
Ellen; Soucat, Agnes. 2011. Reducing Geographical Imbalances of Health
Workers in Sub-Saharan Africa : A Labor Market Perspective on What
Works, What Does Not, and Why. World Bank Working Paper No. 209.
Africa Human Development Series. World Bank.
Lemos, Renata; Scur, Daniela. 2016. Developing Management: An
expanded evaluation tool for developing countries. RISE Working Paper
7.
Miller, Grant; Babiarz, Kim. 2014. Pay-for-Performance Incentives in
Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs. In ”Encyclopedia of
Health Economics”. Elsevier.
Mingat, Alain; Tan, Jee-Peng; Sosale, Shobhana. 2003. Tools for
Education: Policy Analysis. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Ministere de l’economie, de la planification, et de l’amenagement du
territoire, Republique du Cameroun. 2013. Document de Strategie du
Secteur de l’Education et de la Formation (2013-2020).
103
Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training and Early Education,
Government of the Republic of Zambia. 2011. Education Sector National
Implementation Framework III 2011-2015.
Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, Government of the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh. 2015. Third Primary Education Development
Program (PEDP-3) - Revised.
Mulkeen, Aidan. 2010. Teachers in Anglophone Africa : Issues in Teacher
Supply, Training, and Management. Development Practice in Education.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Munga, M., and Maestad, O. 2009. Measuring Inequalities in the
Distribution of Health Workers: The Case of Tanzania. Human Resources
for Health 7 (4).
Muralidharan, Karthik; Das, Jishnu; Holla, Alaka; Mohpal, Aakash. 2017.
The fiscal cost of weak governance: Evidence from teacher absence in
India. Journal of Public Economics 145, 116-135.
Muralidharan, K.; Sundararaman, V. 2011. Teacher performance pay:
experimental evidence from India. Journal of Political Economy 119 (1),
39-77.
Muralidharan, K.; Sundararaman, V. 2013. Contract Teachers: Experi-
mental Evidence from India. NBER Working Paper No. 19440.
Panjabi, Raj. 2016. Four difficult truths highlighted by the Ebola
epidemic. TED. Retrieved from https://ideas.ted.com/four-difficult-truths-
highlighted-by-the-ebola-epidemic/ on 24/06/2018.
Pugatch, Todd; Schroeder, Elizabeth. 2014. Incentives for teacher
relocation: Evidence from the Gambian hardship allowance. Economics
104
of Education Review 41, 120-136.
Ramachandran, Vimala; Beteille, Tara; Linden, Toby; Dey, Sangeeta;
Goyal, Sangeeta; Goel Chatterjee, Prerna. 2018. Getting the Right
Teachers into the Right Schools : Managing India’s Teacher Workforce.
World Bank Studies. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Restuccia, Diego; Rogerson, Richard. 2017. The Causes and Costs of
Misallocation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 31 (3), 151-74.
Rivkin, Steven G.; Schiman, Jeffrey C. 2015. Instruction time, classroom
quality, and academic achievement. The Economic Journal 125 (588) F425-
F448.
Scheffler, Richard M.; Campbell, James; Cometto, Giorgio; Maeda, Akiko;
Liu, Jenny; Bruckner, Tim A.; Arnold, Daniel R.; Evans, Tim. 2018.
Forecasting imbalances in the global health labor market and devising
policy responses. Human Resources for Health 16 (5).
Sharma, Rashmi; Ramachandran, Vimala. 2009. The Elementary
Education System in India: Exploring Institutional Structures, Processes
and Dynamics. New Delhi: Routledge India.
Steiner-Khamsi, Gita. 2010. Teacher Recruitment, Development and
Retention. UNICEF ESARO: 3-country study in Lesotho, Swaziland,
Malawi. Funded by UNICEF ESARO, Nairobi/Kenya.
Sow, Soule. 2015. Are Cities Preferred to Villages? Estimating Location
Preference in A Developing Country. Working paper.
Weiss, Daniel; Nelson, A.; Gibson, H.S.; Temperley,W.; Peedell, S.; Lieber,
A.; Hancher, M.; Poyart, E.; Belchior, S.; Fullman, N.; Mappin, B.;
Dalrymple, U.; Rozier, J.; Lucas, T.C.D.; Howes, R.E.; Tusting, L.S.; Kang,
105
S.Y.; Cameron, E.; Bisanzio, D.; Battle, K.E.; Bhatt, S.; Gething, P.W. 2018.
A global map of travel time to cities to assess inequalities in accessibility
in 2015. Nature.
World Bank. 2008. Teacher Employment and Deployment in Indonesia:
Opportunities for Equity, Efficiency and Quality Improvement. Washing-
ton, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2018. World Development Report 2018: Learning to Realize
Education’s Promise. Washington, DC: World Bank.
UNESCO. 2006. Teachers and Educational Quality: Monitoring Global
Needs for 2015. Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
106
Appendices
107
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1:
Introduction
108
0
.2
.4
.6
S
ha
re
 o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s
4 5 6 7
Years of free primary education guaranteed in legal framework
Figure A.1: Years of free primary education guaranteed in legal
framework across countries
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database. Data from 2015. Sample size: 185 countries.
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framework across countries
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database. Data from 2015. Sample size: 195 countries.
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Figure A.3: Share of primary school pupils in public institutions and
income across countries
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database. Data from 2013. Sample size: 128 countries. Marker size indicates size of the primary
school aged population (ages 5-14).
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Figure A.4: Government expenditure on teacher compensation and
income across countries
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database. Data from 2013. Sample size: 64 countries.
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Figure A.5: National PTR in primary education and per capita income
across countries
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database. Data from 2013. Sample size: 83 countries.
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Figure B.1: Primary school enrollment in Africa
Source: Afrobarometer Round 6 (2014-2015). Sample: 36 countries.
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Figure B.2: Primary school completion and survival across countries by
per capita income
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database (2013). Sample size: 83 and 49 countries, respectively.
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Table C.1: Core data sources
Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Share w/o PTR
Antigua and Barbuda Census Download Educational Statistical Digest 2012; Ministry of Education, Sports, Youth and
Gender Affairs; Antigua and Barbuda; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.ag/#
07.08.2017 0%
Argentina Census Download Direccion Nacional de Informacion y Estadistica Educativa; Ministerio de
Educacion y Deportes; Argentina; Retrieved from:
http://portales.educacion.gov.ar/diniece/2016/08/24/bases-de-datos-por-
escuela-con-id/
22.01.2017 1%
Australia1 Census Data request Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority 25.04.2017 < 1%
Austria Burgenland Census Data request Landesschulrat fuer Burgenland 18.04.2017 0%
Austria Niederoesterreich Census Data request Landesschulrat fuer Niederoesterreich 25.04.2017 0%
Austria Oberoesterreich Census Data request Landesschulrat fuer Oberoesterreich 31.03.2017 0%
Austria Steiermark Census Data request Landesschulrat fuer Steiermark 02.05.2017 0%
Belgium Flanders Census Data request Education and Training; Flemish Community of Belgium 13.12.2017 0%
Benin Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Bhutan Census Download Annual Education Statistics 2015; Ministry of Education; Royal Government
of Bhutan; Retrieved from: http://www.education.gov.bt/statistic
22.01.2017 < 1%
Botswana Census Download Ministry of Education and Skills Development; Botswana; Retrieved from:
http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries–Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-of-
Education-and-Skills-Development/Schools/Public-Primary-Schools/
18.11.2016 < 1%
Brazil Census Download Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anisio Teixeira;
Ministerio da Educacao; Brazil; Retrieved from:
http://dados.gov.br/dataset/microdados-do-censo-escolar
04.11.2016 0%
Burkina Faso Census Data request Ministere de l’Education Nationale et de l’Alphabetisation, Burkina Faso 15.03.2018 0%
Burundi Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Cambodia Census Download Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports; Cambodia; Retrieved from:
https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/dataset/?id=school-of-cambodia-
2012
28.03.2018 9%
Cameroon Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Canada New Brunswick Census Data request Department of Education and Early Childhood Development; New Brunswick 15.06.2017 0%
Canada2 Ontario Census Data request Ministry of Education; Ontario 20.06.2017 18%
Cape Verde Census Download Anuario da Educacao 2014/2015; Ministerio da Educacao e Desporto; Cape
Verde; Retrieved from: http://www.minedu.gov.cv/index.php?option=com -
jdownloads&view=summary&id=913:anuario-da-educacao-ano-letivo-2014-
2015&catid=4&Itemid=574
23.11.2016 5%
Chad Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Chile Census Download Centro de Estudios; Ministerio de Educacion; Gobierno de Chile; Retrieved
from: http://centroestudios.mineduc.cl/tp modulos/tpm -
seccion/contVentana.php?cc=2179
07.11.2016 0%
Colombia Census Download Investigacion de Educacion Formal; Departamento Administrativo Nacional
de Estadistica; Colombia; Retrieved from:
http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/MICRODATOS/aboutcollection/25/2
14.08.2018 1%
Congo, Rep. Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Costa Rica Census Data request Departamento de AnA˜¡lisis EstadA˜stico; Ministerio de Educacion Publica;
Costa Rica
17.05.2017 0%
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Table C.1: Core data sources
Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Share w/o PTR
Cote d’Ivoire Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Czech Republic Census Data request Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic 07.04.2017 < 1%
Denmark Census Data request Undervisningsministeriet; Styrelsen for It og LA˜ring; Center for Data og
Analyse; Denmark
18.09.2017 2%
Djibouti Census Download Annuaire Statistique 2014-2015; Ministere de laˆEducation Nationale et de la
Formation Professionnelle; Republique de Djibouti; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.dj/
09.01.2017 0%
Dominican Republic Census Data request Instituto Dominicano de Evaluacion e Investigacion de la Calidad Educativa 13.04.2018 0%
Ecuador Census Data request Ministerio de Educacion; Ecuador 03.03.2017 < 1%
El Salvador Census Download Ministerio de Educacion; Republica de El Salvador; Retrieved from:
https://www.mined.gob.sv/index.php/estadisticas-educativas/item/6116-
bases-de-centros
11.12.2016 0%
Estonia Census Data request Analysis Department; Estonian Ministry of Education and Research 24.04.2017 0%
Fiji Census Download Ministry of Education; Fiji; Retrieved from: http://www.education.gov.fj/ 07.04.2017 1%
France Census Download Ministere de l’Education nationale, de l’Enseignement Superieur et de la
Recherche; France; Retrieved from: https://data.education.gouv.fr/
23.01.2017 < 1%
Georgia Census Download eCatalog; Education Management Information System; Georgia; Retrieved
from:
http://catalog.edu.ge/index.php?module=school info&page=region list
29.05.2017 0%
Germany Hamburg Census Data request Behoerde fuer Schule und Berufsbildung; Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 15.05.2017 0%
Germany Hessen Census Data request Hessisches Kultusministerium 28.03.2017 0%
Germany Schleswig-Holstein Census Data request Ministerium fuer Schule und Berufsbildung des Landes Schleswig-Holstein 03.04.2017 0%
Germany Thueringen Census Data request Thueringer Ministerium fuer Bildung, Jugend, und Sport 20.03.2017 0%
Guatemala Census Download Direccion de Planificacion; Ministerio de Educacion; Guatemala; Retrieved
from: http://estadistica.mineduc.gob.gt/BDD/
12.11.2016 4%
Guinea-Bissau Census Data request Ministerio da Educacao e do Ensino Superior; Guinea-Bissau 11.12.2017 6%
Honduras Census Download Unidad de Planeamiento y Evaluacion la Gestion; Secretaria de Educacion de
Honduras; Retrieved from:
http://estadisticas.se.gob.hn/see/archivos descargables.php
18.12.2017 0%
Hungary3 Census Data request Hungarian Central Statistical Office 06.03.2017 < 1%
India Census Data request District Information System for Education; National University of Educational
Planning and Administration; India
24.11.2016 1%
Ireland Census Download Department of Education and Skills; Ireland; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.ie/en/Publications/Statistics/Data-on-Individual-
Schools/Data-on-Individual-Schools.html
17.11.2016 0%
Jamaica Census Data request Ministry of Education, Jamaica 24.02.2017 0%
Kenya Survey Download UWEZO; Retrieved from: http://www.uwezo.net/publications/datasets/ 21.03.2017 N/A
Kiribati Census Download Digest of Education Statistics 2011; Ministry of Education; Republic of
Kiribati; Retrieved from: http://prism.spc.int/reports/education
25.11.2016 0%
Kyrgyzstan Census Download Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic; Retrieved from:
http://edu.gov.kg/ru/docs/statistics/
07.02.2017 < 1%
Laos Census Data request Ministry of Education and Sports; Lao People’s Democratic Republic 10.04.2018 0%
Latvia Census Data request Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia 21.03.2017 0%
Liberia Census Download Ministry of Education; Republic of Liberia; Retrieved from:
http://moe.gov.lr/documents/
06.12.2017 5%
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Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Share w/o PTR
Libya Census Download Libya National Schools Assessment 2012; REACH Initiative; Retrieved from:
https://data.humdata.org/dataset/reach-libya-national-schools-assessment-
2012
13.02.2017 11%
Lithuania Census Data request Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania 06.03.2017 0%
Madagascar Census Data request Madagascar Ministere de l’Education Nationale 11.03.2017 < 1%
Malawi Census Data request Ministry of Education; Malawi 21.03.2017 0%
Marshall Islands Census Download Education Digest 2013-2014; Ministry of Education; Republic of the Marshall
Islands; Retrieved from: http://prism.spc.int/reports/education
25.11.2016 0%
Mexico Census Download Sistema Nacional de Informacion de Escuelas; Secretaria de Educacion
Publica; Mexico; Retrieved from: http://www.snie.sep.gob.mx/SNIESC/
02.10.2017 2%
Moldova Census Data request National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova 10.05.2017 0%
Mongolia Census Data request National Statistical Office of Mongolia 12.01.2017 4%
Mozambique Census Data request Ministerio da Educacao e Desenvolvimento Humano; Republica da
Mocambique
08.05.2017 0%
Netherlands Census Download Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs; Ministerie van OCW; Retrieved from:
https://www.duo.nl/open onderwijsdata/databestanden/po/
06.02.2017 < 1%
New Zealand Census Download Education Counts; Ministry of Education; New Zealand Government;
Retrieved from: http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/statistics/schooling/
02.11.2016 < 1%
Niger Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Norway Census Data request Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training; Department of Statistics 08.02.2017 < 1%
Pakistan Balochistan Census Download Balochistan EMIS; Retrieved from:
http://emis.gob.pk/views/Reports/Reports/SchoolSearchPublic.aspx
02.09.2018 12%
Pakistan Punjab Census Download Department of School Education; Government of Punjab; Retrieved from:
http://www.pesrp.edu.pk/datacenter#district ranking
19.05.2017 3%
Pakistan Sindh Census Download Education and Literacy Department; Government of Sindh; Retrieved from:
http://www.rsu-sindh.gov.pk/downloads/schoolSearch.php
23.05.2017 < 1%
Palau Census Download 2011 Statistical Yearbook; Ministry of Education; Republic of Palau; Retrieved
from: http://prism.spc.int/reports/education
25.05.2018 0%
Papua New Guinea Census Download Department of Education; Papua New Guinea; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.pg/quicklinks/wms/school-profile.html
06.12.2016 < 1%
Paraguay Census Download Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencias; Paraguay; Retrieved from:
http://datos.mec.gov.py/data
24.01.2017 16%
Peru Census Download Censo Escolar 2016; Ministerio de Educacion; Peru; Retrieved from:
http://escale.minedu.gob.pe/uee/-
/document library display/GMv7/view/2979785
07.11.2016 0%
Philippines Census Download Department of Education; Republic of the Philippines; Retrieved from:
http://www.deped.gov.ph/datasets
22.11.2016 2%
Poland Census Download Centrum Informatyczne Edukacji; Poland; Retrieved from:
https://cie.men.gov.pl/sio-strona-glowna/podstawowe-informacje-dotyczce-
wykazu-szko-i-placowek-owiatowych/wykaz-wg-typow/
29.01.2018 26%
Puerto Rico Census Download U.S. Department of Education; National Center for Education Statistics;
Common Core of Data (CCD); Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe
Survey CCD School Data 2014-15; Retrieved from: http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
10.07.2017 < 1%
Saint Kitts and Nevis Census Download Statistical Digest 2013-2014; St. Kitts and Nevis Ministry of Education;
Retrieved from: http://www.moeskn.org/
08.12.2016 0%
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Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Share w/o PTR
Saint Lucia Census Download Education Statistical Digest 2015; Ministry of Education, Human Resource
Development and Labour; Government of St. Lucia; Retrieved from:
http://education.govt.lc/publications/
08.12.2016 0%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Census Download Education Statistical Digest of St. Vincent & the Grenadines 2014-2015;
Retrieved from: http://www.education.gov.vc/education/
25.05.2018 0%
Samoa Census Download Education Statistical Digest 2015; Ministry of Education, Sports, and Culture;
Samoa; Retrieved from: http://prism.spc.int/reports/education
25.11.2016 0%
Senegal Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Seychelles Census Download Education Statistics 2012; Ministry of Education; Republic of Seychelles;
Retrieved from: http://www.education.gov.sc/Pages/statistics.aspx
24.11.2016 0%
South Africa Census Download Education Management Information System; National Department of Basic
Education; South Africa; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.za/Programmes/EMIS.aspx
02.11.2016 4%
South Sudan Census Download Education Management Information System; South Sudan; Retrieved from:
http://www.southsudanemis.org/data
04.11.2016 < 1%
Sudan Karthoum Census Download Ministry of Education; Sudan; Retrieved from: http://moekh.gov.sd/ 10.02.2017 23%
Suriname Census Data request Ministerie van Onderwijs, Wetenschap un Cultuur; Suriname 23.08.2017 < 1%
Swaziland Census Data request Ministry of Education and Training; Swaziland 30.11.2016 0%
Sweden Census Download SiRiS; National Agency for Education; Sweden; Retrieved from:
http://siris.skolverket.se/siris/
25.05.2018 < 1%
Tanzania Census Download President’s Office; Regional Administration and Local Government; The
United Republic of Tanzania; Retrieved from:
http://opendata.go.tz/dataset/uwiano-wa-mwalimu-kwa-wanafunzi-kwa-
shule-za-msingi-za-serikali-2016
04.11.2016 9%
Togo Survey Data request Programme d’analyse des systemes educatifs de la confemen (PASEC) 2014 07.07.2017 N/A
Uganda Census Data request Ministry of Education and Sports; The Republic of Uganda 23.08.2017 < 1%
UK England Census Download Department for Education; England; Retrieved from:
https://data.gov.uk/dataset/
07.02.2017 < 1%
UK Northern Ireland Census Download Department for Education; Northern Ireland; Retrieved from:
https://www.education-ni.gov.uk/articles/
07.02.2017 0%
UK Scotland Census Download Scottish Government; Retrieved from:
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/School-Education/
07.02.2017 < 1%
UK Wales Census Download StatsWales; Retrieved from:
https://statswales.gov.wales/Catalogue/Education-and-Skills/Schools-and-
Teachers/Schools-Census/Pupil-Level-Annual-School-Census/
07.02.2017 0%
Ukraine Census Download School Map of Ukraine; Retrieved from:
http://cedos.org.ua/edustat/databox
29.01.2017 1%
Uruguay Census Download Administracion Nacional de Educacion Publica; Uruguay; Retrieved from:
http://www.anep.edu.uy/portalmonitor/servlet/buscarescuela
12.03.2018 < 1%
US Census Download U.S. Department of Education; National Center for Education Statistics;
Common Core of Data (CCD); Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe
Survey CCD School Data 2014-15; Retrieved from: http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
10.07.2017 1%
Zambia Census Data request Ministry of Education; Zambia 14.06.2016 12%
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Table C.1: Core data sources
Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Share w/o PTR
This table lists the data sources for the core data for all countries. In the last column, it also indicates the share of public primary schools for which the PTR could not be computed due to missing information. This is
computed as the number of public primary school without PTR information over the total number of public primary schools listed. It is possible that for a given country the obtained list of public primary schools itself is
incomplete. In this case the indicated share of schools for which the PTR could not be computed is an underestimate of the true share without PTR information.
1Disclaimer: The data used in this publication are sourced from the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority
(ACARA) and are available from ACARA in accordance with its Data Access Protocols.
2PTR information for schools with less than 10 teacher FTEs was not available. This accounts entirely for the share of schools
without PTR information.
3Disclaimer: Results for Hungary have been created with the use of WTorsten cimlista altisk tan ped 2015-16.xlsx Datafile
prepared upon individual request by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (www.ksh.hu). The calculations and the conclusion
are the sole intellectual products of the author Torsten Figueiredo Walter.
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Table C.2: PTR time series data
Country Time Span
Argentina 2011-2015
Bhutan 2005-2016
Cape Verde 2004, 2006-2015
Chile 2004-2016
El Salvador 2007-2010, 2013
India 2005-2006, 2008-2015
Ireland 2006-2015
Mozambique 2004-2016
Netherlands 2011-2016
New Zealand 2008-2016
Peru 2004-2016
Puerto Rico 1990-2015
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2011-2016
South Africa 2007-2013, 2015-2016
South Sudan 2008-2013, 2015
Sweden 1999-2016
Uganda 2013-2016
Uruguay 2011-2015
US 1990-2015
Zambia 2002, 2006-2016
This table lists the countries for which school-level pupil-teacher ratio data from the universe of public
primary schools was collected for four or more years. For each country, the table indicates the years for
which data was obtained. The source of the additional years of data is identical to the source provided in
table C.1.
Table C.3: Regions and subregions
Country Region definition Regions Subregion definition Subregions
Antigua and Barbuda Education Zone 4 N/A N/A
Argentina Province 24 N/A N/A
Australia State 8 N/A N/A
Austria State (NUTS-2) 4 Groups of Municipalities (NUTS-3) 25
Belgium Province (NUTS-2) 6 Arrondissements (NUTS-3) 23
Bhutan Dzongkhag 20 N/A N/A
Botswana District 14 N/A N/A
Brazil State 27 Municipality 5556
Burkina Faso Region 13 Province 45
Cambodia Province 24 District 186
Canada Province 2 County/District 66
Cape Verde Concelho 22 N/A N/A
Chile Region 13 Province 53
Colombia Department 33 Municipality 1118
Costa Rica Province 7 Canton 81
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Table C.3: Regions and subregions
Country Region definition Regions Subregion definition Subregions
Czech Republic Oblast (NUTS-2) 8 Regions (NUTS-3) 14
Denmark Region (NUTS-2) 5 Province (NUTS-2) 11
Djibouti Region 6 N/A N/A
Dominican Republic Region 10 Province 32
Ecuador Province 25 Canton 216
El Salvador Department 14 Municipality 255
Estonia Group of counties (NUTS-3) 5 County (LAU-1) 15
Fiji Group of districts 9 N/A N/A
France Region (NUTS-2) 25 Department (NUTS-3) 99
Georgia Region 12 Municipality 69
Germany State (NUTS-1) 4 District (NUTS-3) 67
Guatemala Region 8 Department 23
Guinea-Bissau Region 9 Sector 42
Honduras Department 18 Municipality 269
Hungary Planning and statistical region (NUTS-2) 7 County (NUTS-3) 20
India State 35 District 679
Ireland NUTS-2 Statistical Regions 2 NUTS-3 Statistical Regions 8
Jamaica County 3 Parish 14
Kiribati District 4 N/A N/A
Kyrgyzstan Region 8 District 59
Laos Province 18 District 145
Latvia Statistical Regions (NUTS-3) 6 District (LAU-1) 33
Liberia County 15 District 99
Libya District 23 N/A N/A
Lithuania County (NUTS-3) 10 N/A N/A
Madagascar Province 6 Region 22
Malawi Region 3 District 34
Marshall Islands Municipality 24 N/A N/A
Mexico State 32 Municipality 2316
Moldova Region 5 District 35
Mongolia Province 22 N/A N/A
Mozambique Province 11 District 160
Netherlands Province (NUTS-2) 12 N/A N/A
New Zealand Region 16 District 86
Norway Region 7 County (NUTS-3) 19
Pakistan Province 3 District 91
Palau N/A N/A N/A N/A
Papua New Guinea Province 20 District 88
Paraguay Department 18 District 254
Peru Region 25 Province 196
Philippines Region 17 Province 83
Poland Voivodeship (NUTS-2) 16 Subregions (NUTS-3) 72
Puerto Rico Municipality 77 N/A N/A
Saint Kitts and Nevis Island 2 N/A N/A
Saint Lucia District 8 N/A N/A
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines District 11 N/A N/A
Samoa District 9 N/A N/A
Seychelles N/A N/A N/A N/A
South Africa Province 9 District 52
South Sudan State 10 District 38
Sudan State 1 District 6
Suriname District 10 N/A N/A
Swaziland N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sweden National area (NUTS-2) 8 County (NUTS-3) 21
Tanzania Region 25 District 180
Uganda Region 4 District 118
UK NUTS-2 Statistical Regions 39 NUTS-3 Statistical Regions 168
Ukraine Oblast 27 Raion 626
Uruguay Department 19 N/A N/A
US State 51 County 1849
Zambia Province 10 District 103
This table shows the definition of a region used throughout this paper for every country and the number of these regions contained in the data. The
table does not contain countries for which survey data was collected as sample sizes in those countries are two small for a meaningful breakdown across
sub-national units. Countries for which only data from a subset of regions was collected are marked with an asterisk. For Swaziland, information on
school location was not available. For Palau and Seychelles, information on the administrative divisions in which schools are located was not gathered
as the total number of schools in these countries is very small.
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Table C.4: GPS coordinates data sources
Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Completeness Shared coordinates
Antigua and Barbuda - Address Download Educational Statistical Digest 2012; Ministry of
Education, Sports, Youth and Gender Affairs;
Antigua and Barbuda; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.ag/
07.08.2017 100% 0%
Australia - Coordinates Data request Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting
Authority
25.04.2017 100% < 1%
Austria Burgenland Address Data request Landesschulrat fuer Burgenland 18.04.2017 100% 6%
Austria Niederoesterreich Address Data request Landesschulrat fuer Niederoesterreich 25.04.2017 100% 2%
Austria Oberoesterreich Address Data request Landesschulrat fuer Oberoesterreich 31.03.2017 100% 2%
Austria Steiermark Address Download Schulendatei Online; Bundesministerium fuer
Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung; Retrieved
from: https://www.schulen-online.at/
25.08.2017 100% 0%
Belgium Flanders Coordinates Data request Education and Training; Flemish Community of
Belgium
13.12.2017 100% < 1%
Cambodia - Coordinates Download Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports; Cambodia;
Retrieved from:
https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/dataset/?id=school-
of-cambodia-2012
02.10.2017 100% 1%
Canada New Brunswick Address Data request Department of Education and Early Childhood
Development; New Brunswick
15.06.2017 99% 0%
Canada Ontario Address Data request Ministry of Education; Ontario 20.06.2017 100% < 1%
Chile - Coordinates Download Centro de Estudios; Ministerio de Educacion;
Gobierno de Chile; Retrieved from:
http://centroestudios.mineduc.cl/tp -
modulos/tpm seccion/contVentana.php?cc=2179
07.11.2016 100% 2%
Czech Republic - Coordinates Data request Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the
Czech Republic
07.04.2017 100% 1%
Denmark - Address Data request Undervisningsministeriet; Styrelsen for It og
LA˜ring; Center for Data og Analyse; Denmark
18.09.2017 100% < 1%
Dominican Republic - Coordinates Data request Instituto Dominicano de Evaluacion e Investigacion
de la Calidad Educativa
13.04.2018 99% < 1%
Ecuador - Coordinates Data request Ministerio de Educacion; Ecuador 03.03.2017 96% 2%
El Salvador - Coordinates Download Ministerio de Educacion; Republica de El Salvador;
Retrieved from:
https://www.mined.gob.sv/index.php/estadisticas-
educativas/item/6116-bases-de-centros
11.12.2016 99% 2%
Estonia - Coordinates Data request Analysis Department; Estonian Ministry of
Education and Research
24.04.2017 100% 0%
Fiji - Coordinates Download Ministry of Education; Fiji; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.fj/
06.03.2018 98% < 1%
France - Coordinates Download Ministere de l’Education Nationale, de
l’Enseignement Superieur et de la Recherche; France;
Retrieved from: https://data.education.gouv.fr/
23.01.2017 100% 1%
Germany Hamburg Address Data request Behoerde fuer Schule und Berufsbildung; Freie und
Hansestadt Hamburg
15.05.2017 100% 1%
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Table C.4: GPS coordinates data sources
Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Completeness Shared coordinates
Germany Hessen Address Data request Hessisches Kultusministerium 28.03.2017 100% 0%
Germany Schleswig-Holstein Address Data request Ministerium fuer Schule und Berufsbildung des
Landes Schleswig-Holstein
03.04.2017 100% < 1%
Germany Thueringen Address Data request Thueringer Ministerium fuer Bildung, Jugend, und
Sport
20.03.2017 100% < 1%
Guatemala - Coordinates Download Ministerio de Educacion; Guatemala; Retrieved
from: http://www.mineduc.gob.gt/ie/Ministerio
de Educacion; Guatemala; Retrieved from:
http://www.mineduc.gob.gt/ie/
12.11.2016 47% 15%
Guinea-Bissau - Coordinates Data request Ministerio da Educacao e do Ensino Superior;
Guinea-Bissau
29.09.2017 99% < 1%
Hungary4 - Address Data request Hungarian Central Statistical Office 06.03.2017 100% 1%
Ireland - Coordinates Download Department of Education and Skills; Ireland;
Retrieved from:
http://www.education.ie/en/Publications/Statistics/Data-
on-Individual-Schools/Data-on-Individual-
Schools.html
25.04.2018 99% 2%
Jamaica - Coordinates Data request Ministry of Education, Jamaica 24.02.2017 100% 1%
Latvia - Address Data request Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of
Latvia
21.03.2017 97% 2%
Liberia - Coordinates Download FHI360; Retrieved from:
http://fhi360odk.org/kdesktoplb 2/
14.10.2017 65% 0%
Libya - Coordinates Download Libya National Schools Assessment 2012; REACH
Initiative; Retrieved from:
https://data.humdata.org/dataset/reach-libya-
national-schools-assessment-2012
13.02.2017 100% 26%
Lithuania - Address Data request Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of
Lithuania
06.03.2017 98% 2%
Malawi - Coordinates Data request Ministry of Education; Malawi 21.03.2017 90% 0%
Marshall Islands - Address Download Education Digest 2013-2014; Ministry of Education;
Republic of the Marshall Islands; Retrieved from:
http://prism.spc.int/reports/education
25.11.2016 88% 37%
Mexico - Coordinates Download Sistema Nacional de Informacion de Escuelas;
Secretaria de Educacion Publica; Mexico; Retrieved
from: http://www.snie.sep.gob.mx/SNIESC/
02.10.2017 100% 24%
Mongolia - Coordinates Data request National Statistical Office of Mongolia 12.01.2017 80% 0%
Mozambique - Coordinates Data request Ministerio da Educacao e Desenvolvimento
Humano; Republica da Mocambique
08.05.2017 95% 2%
Netherlands - Address Download Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs; Ministerie van OCW;
Retrieved from: https://www.duo.nl/open -
onderwijsdata/databestanden/po/
06.02.2017 100% < 1%
New Zealand - Coordinates Download Ministry of Education; New Zealand Government;
Retrieved from:
https://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/data-
services/directories/list-of-nz-schools
02.10.2017 99% 0%
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Table C.4: GPS coordinates data sources
Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Completeness Shared coordinates
Norway - Address Download Pedlex; Retrieved from: http://skoleadresser.no/ 22.08.2018 96% < 1%
Pakistan Punjab Coordinates Download School Education Department; Government of
Punjab; Retrieved from:
http://schoolportal.punjab.gov.pk/census/
06.10.2017 94% 5%
Pakistan Sindh Coordinates Download Education and Literacy Department; Government of
Sindh; Retrieved from: http://www.rsu-
sindh.gov.pk/downloads/schoolSearch.php
05.02.2018 74% 5%
Paraguay - Coordinates Download Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencias; Paraguay;
Retrieved from: http://datos.mec.gov.py/data
24.01.2017 94% < 1%
Peru - Coordinates Download Ministerio de Educacion; Peru; Retrieved from:
http://sigmed.minedu.gob.pe/mapaeducativo/Ministerio
de Educacion; Peru; Retrieved from:
http://sigmed.minedu.gob.pe/mapaeducativo/
27.09.2017 99% < 1%
Philippines - Coordinates Download Department of Education; Philippines; Retrieved
from: https://deped.carto.com/tables/deped -
school location with enrolment 2014 2015/public
23.01.2018 87% 2%
Poland - Address Download Centrum Informatyczne Edukacji; Poland; Retrieved
from: https://cie.men.gov.pl/sio-strona-
glowna/podstawowe-informacje-dotyczce-wykazu-
szko-i-placowek-owiatowych/wykaz-wg-typow/
29.01.2018 96% 5%
Puerto Rico - Coordinates Download U.S. Department of Education; National Center for
Education Statistics; Common Core of Data (CCD);
Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe
Survey CCD School Data 2014-15; Retrieved from:
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
10.07.2017 100% 10%
Saint Kitts and Nevis - Address Download Statistical Digest 2013-2014; St. Kitts and Nevis
Ministry of Education; Retrieved from:
http://www.moeskn.org/
08.12.2016 100% 0%
Saint Lucia - Address Download Education Statistical Digest 2015; Ministry of
Education, Human Resource Development and
Labour; Government of St. Lucia; Retrieved from:
http://education.govt.lc/publications/
08.12.2016 100% 19%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - Address Download Education Statistical Digest of St. Vincent & the
Grenadines 2014-2015; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.vc/education/
08.12.2016 96% 3%
Samoa - Address Download Education Statistical Digest 2015; Ministry of
Education, Sports, and Culture; Samoa; Retrieved
from: http://prism.spc.int/reports/education
25.11.2016 83% 13%
South Africa - Coordinates Download Education Management Information System;
National Department of Basic Education; South
Africa; Retrieved from:
http://www.education.gov.za/Programmes/EMIS.aspx
02.11.2016 99% 1%
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Table C.4: GPS coordinates data sources
Country State/Province Data type Collection method Data source Date obtained Completeness Shared coordinates
South Sudan - Coordinates Download Education Management Information System; South
Sudan; Retrieved from:
http://www.southsudanemis.org/data
04.11.2016 81% 41%
Tanzania - Coordinates Download President’s Office; Regional Administration and
Local Government; The United Republic of
Tanzania; Retrieved from:
http://opendata.go.tz/dataset/
02.02.2018 72% 22%
Uganda - Coordinates Download Schooling Uganda; Retrieved from:
https://schooling.ug/
20.10.2017 74% 0%
UK England Address Download Department for Education; England; Retrieved from:
https://data.gov.uk/dataset/
09.07.2017 100% 1%
UK Northern Ireland Address Download Department for Education; Northern Ireland;
Retrieved from: http://apps.education-
ni.gov.uk/appinstitutes/default.aspx
07.02.2017 100% 0%
UK Scotland Address Download Scottish Government; Retrieved from:
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/School-
Education/
07.02.2017 100% 2%
UK Wales Address Download Statistics Wales; Welsh Government; Retrieved from:
http://gov.wales/statistics-and-research/address-
list-of-schools/?lang=en
07.02.2017 100% 3%
Uruguay - Coordinates Download Administracion Nacional de Educacion Publica;
Uruguay; Retrieved from:
http://sig.anep.edu.uy/siganep
02.04.2018 100% 8%
US - Coordinates Download U.S. Department of Education; National Center for
Education Statistics; Common Core of Data (CCD);
Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe
Survey CCD School Data 2014-15; Retrieved from:
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
10.07.2017 100% 1%
Zambia - Coordinates Data request Ministry of Education; Zambia 14.06.2016 77% 3%
This table lists the data sources for the GPS coordinates of public primary schools for all countries where such data could be obtained. The last two columns indicate the share of schools for which coordinates were obtained
and the share of schools with coordinates that have identical coordinates as one or more other schools.
4Disclaimer: Results for Hungary have been created with the use of WTorsten cimlista altisk tan ped 2015-16.xlsx Datafile
prepared upon individual request by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (www.ksh.hu). The calculations and the conclusion
are the sole intellectual products of the author Torsten Figueiredo Walter.
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Table C.5: PTR variation and primary schooling outcomes across
countries - full census only
Primary school completion Primary school survival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National PTR -0.00497∗∗ -0.000815 -0.00103 -0.00545∗∗∗ -0.00155 -0.00168
(0.00200) (0.00272) (0.00278) (0.00151) (0.00210) (0.00207)
PTR SD -0.0116∗∗ -0.0114∗∗
(0.00535) (0.00451)
(PTR SD)x(GDP pc high) -0.00833 -0.00391
(0.00905) (0.00662)
(PTR SD)x(GDP pc low) -0.0114∗∗ -0.0117∗∗
(0.00542) (0.00445)
log GDP pc 0.0502∗∗ 0.0298 0.0241 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0436∗
(0.0247) (0.0257) (0.0288) (0.0202) (0.0206) (0.0228)
log Population 0.00227 0.00750 0.00696 -0.00879 -0.00228 -0.00344
(0.00823) (0.00833) (0.00847) (0.00695) (0.00707) (0.00701)
R2 0.424 0.468 0.470 0.728 0.761 0.772
N 62 62 62 52 52 52
Mean Dep. Var. 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.807 0.807 0.807
PTR SD IQR 6.061 6.061 6.061 6.059 6.059 6.059
The primary school survival rate is defined as the survival rate until the last grade of
primary education. The latest available data as of 06/05/2017 is used for each country.
”Log GDP pc” is the logarithm of the GDP per capita in PPP terms. ”GDP pc low
(high)” is a dummy variable that takes value one when the logarithm of the GDP per
capita in PPP terms is below (above) the median. Outcome variables and income and
population data (both 2015) are from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World
Bank International Comparison Program Database. The national PTR is defined as the
ratio of the total number of public primary school pupils over the total number of public
primary school teachers in a country. The PTR SD is defined as the PTR standard
deviation across all public primary schools in a country. PTR SD IQR indicates the
interquartile range in the PTR SD across countries. The sample of countries is restricted
to those where school census data for the entire country is available. Standard errors in
parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.6: PTR variation and primary schooling outcomes across
countries - weighted
Primary school completion Primary school survival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National PTR -0.00476∗∗ -0.00127 -0.00109 -0.00556∗∗∗ -0.00334∗ -0.00355∗
(0.00199) (0.00233) (0.00237) (0.00146) (0.00179) (0.00177)
PTR SD -0.0111∗∗ -0.00761∗∗
(0.00429) (0.00373)
(PTR SD)X(GDP pc high) -0.0160∗ 0.00110
(0.00922) (0.00688)
(PTR SD)X(GDP pc low) -0.0113∗∗ -0.00761∗∗
(0.00433) (0.00368)
log GDP pc 0.0493∗∗ 0.0241 0.0304 0.0723∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.0417∗
(0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0271) (0.0187) (0.0201) (0.0217)
log Population -0.00117 0.00557 0.00614 -0.00989 -0.00417 -0.00474
(0.00792) (0.00803) (0.00813) (0.00643) (0.00685) (0.00678)
R2 0.418 0.475 0.478 0.730 0.750 0.761
N 67 67 67 57 57 57
Mean Dep. Var. 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.837 0.837 0.837
PTR SD IQR 6.759 6.759 6.759 6.689 6.689 6.689
The primary school survival rate is defined as the survival rate until the last grade of
primary education. The latest available data as of 06/05/2017 is used for each country.
”Log GDP pc” is the logarithm of the GDP per capita in PPP terms. ”GDP pc low
(high)” is a dummy variable that takes value one when the logarithm of the GDP per
capita in PPP terms is below (above) the median. Outcome variables and income and
population data (both 2015) are from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World
Bank International Comparison Program Database. The national PTR is defined as the
ratio of the total number of public primary school pupils over the total number of public
primary school teachers in a country. The PTR SD is defined as the PTR standard
deviation across all public primary schools in a country. Schools are weighted by their
enrollment. PTR SD IQR indicates the interquartile range in the PTR SD across countries.
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure C.1: School census return rates among public schools across
African countries
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database. Latest available data for each country as of 13/07/2017. Sample size: 49 countries.
The mean return rate across countries is 97.3%.
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Figure C.2: Number of countries by year of data
For countries where state-level school censuses from several states were obtained the figure only
contains the least recent year.
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Figure C.3: Distribution of primary education entrance age across sample
countries
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and World Bank International Comparison Program
Database. Data from 2015.
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Figure C.4: Distribution of maximum number of grades taught in
included school types
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Figure C.5: PTR variation in public primary education and income across
countries - weighted
The PTR standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation in PTRs across all public
primary schools within a country. Schools are weighted by their enrollment. The grey line is
a linear regression line. Marker size indicates the size of the primary school-aged population
(ages 5 to 14) in a country. GDP per capita and population data are from the World Bank
International Comparison Program database.
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Figure C.6: PTR variation in public primary education and income across
countries - full census only
The PTR standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation in PTRs across all public
primary schools within a country. The grey line is a linear regression line. Marker size indicates
the size of the primary school-aged population (ages 5 to 14) in a country. The sample of countries
is restricted to those where school census data for the entire country is available. GDP per capita
and population data are from the World Bank International Comparison Program database.
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Figure C.7: PTR coefficient of variation in public primary education and
income across countries
The PTR coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation in PTRs across
all public primary schools within a country and the mean PTR across all public primary schools
within a country. Marker size indicates the size of the primary school-aged population (ages 5
to 14) in a country. GDP per capita and population data are from the World Bank International
Comparison Program database.
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Figure C.8: Right tail of the PTR distribution and income across countries
- weighted
The PTR 90-50 difference is defined as the difference between the 90th percentile and the median
of the PTR distribution across all public primary schools within a country. Schools are weighted
by their enrollment. Marker size indicates the size of the primary school-aged population (ages 5
to 14) in a country. GDP per capita and population data are from the World Bank International
Comparison Program database.
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Figure C.9: Right tail of the PTR distribution and income across countries
- full census only
The PTR 90-50 difference is defined as the difference between the 90th percentile and the median
of the PTR distribution across all public primary schools within a country. Marker size indicates
the size of the primary school-aged population (ages 5 to 14) in a country. The sample of countries
is restricted to those where school census data for the entire country is available. GDP per capita
and population data are from the World Bank International Comparison Program database.
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Between-region Within-region
Figure C.10: Cross-school PTR variation within and between regions of a
country
Regions are defined as detailed in table C.3. The sample is comprised of 72 countries. The PTR
standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation in PTRs across all public primary schools
within a country. Lines are linear regression lines. GDP per capita data is from the World Bank
International Comparison Program database.
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Figure C.11: Cross-school PTR variation within and between subregions
of a country
Subregions are defined as detailed in table C.3. The sample is comprised of 51 countries. The PTR
standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation in PTRs across all public primary schools
within a country. Lines are linear regression lines. GDP per capita data is from the World Bank
International Comparison Program database.
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Figure C.12: PTR distribution by quartile of population density (GPW) in
Mozambique
Population density at each public primary school is measured as the density within a circle of
3km radius around the school according to data from the Gridded Population of the World (v4).
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Figure C.13: PTR distribution by quartile of nighttime luminosity in
Mozambique
Nighttime luminosity data is from the Earth Observation Group, NOAA National Geophysical
Data Center (VIIRS 2015).
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Figure C.14: PTR distribution by quartile of travel time to the closest city
in Mozambique
Travel time to closest city is taken from the accessibility to cities data set from the Malaria Atlas
Project at Oxford University (Weiss et al. 2018).
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(b) Within-region R2
Figure C.15: PTRs and population density (GPW) across countries by
income
Beta is the regression coefficient from a country-specific school-level regression of PTR on
population density within a circle of 3km around the school as given by the Gridded Population
of the World (v4) data, controlling for region fixed effects. The adjusted within-region R2 is from
the same regression. Regions are defined as detailed in table C.3. The sample is restricted to 51
countries for which school coordinates were obtained. GDP per capita data is from the World
Bank International Comparison Program database.
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Figure C.16: PTRs and nighttime luminosity across countries by income
Beta is the regression coefficient from a country-specific school-level regression of PTR on average
nighttime luminosity within a circle of 3km radius around the school in 2015, controlling for
region fixed effects. The adjusted within-region R2 is from the same regression. Nighttime
luminosity was obtained from VIIRS nighttime lights data from the Earth Observation Group,
NOAA National Geophysical Data Center. Regions are defined as detailed in table C.3. The
sample is restricted to 50 countries for which school coordinates were obtained. GDP per capita
data is from the World Bank International Comparison Program database.
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(b) Within-region R2
Figure C.17: PTRs and travel time to closest city across countries by
income
Beta is the regression coefficient from a country-specific school-level regression of PTR on travel
time to closest city as given by Weiss et al. (2018), controlling for region fixed effects. The
adjusted within-region R2 is from the same regression. Regions are defined as detailed in table
C.3. The sample is restricted to 50 countries for which school coordinates were obtained. GDP
per capita data is from the World Bank International Comparison Program database (2015).
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Figure C.18: PTR variation within and between rural/urban classification
Rural/urban indicator is country-specific, as provided by the school census data.
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Figure C.19: Actual and counterfactual PTR standard deviation and
national PTR across countries
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Table D.1: Data sources: primary school teacher salaries
Country Salary (GDP pc) Year Source
Cambodia 2.15 2017 Sokhean, B.; Sineat, Y.;
Amaro, Y. Teachers’ wage rally
blocked. In Phnom Penh Post
(06/10/2017). Retrieved from:
https://www.phnompenhpost.com/
national/teachers-wage-rally-blocked
on 23/08/2018.
Guinea-Bissau 4.4 2006 World Bank (2015). Education
Public Expenditure Review in
Zambia.
India 3.0 2004/05 Dreze, Jean; Sen, Amartya. 2013.
An uncertain glory: India and
its contradictions. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Malawi 6.3 2008 World Bank (2015). Education
Public Expenditure Review in
Zambia.
Mozambique 4.0 2003 World Bank (2015). Education
Public Expenditure Review in
Zambia.
Tanzania 3.8 2004 UNESCO Pole de Dakar (2009).
The teacher challenge - Univer-
sal primary education in Africa.
Dakar: UNESCO-BREDA.
Zambia 6.7 2014 World Bank (2015). Education
Public Expenditure Review in
Zambia.
This table indicates the teacher salaries used for costing the results of the counterfactual simulations in chapter 4 and their sources.
Table D.2: Subnational units for counterfactual simulation
Country Subnational unit
Argentina Province
Cambodia Province
Cape Verde Country
Chile Province
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Table D.2: Subnational units for counterfactual simulation
Country Subnational unit
Colombia Department
Djibouti Region
El Salvador Department
Guinea-Bissau Region
Honduras Department
India District
Laos Province
Malawi District
Mozambique District
Peru Province
Saint Lucia Country
Saint Vincent Country
Sweden NUTS-2
Tanzania District
UK (England) NUTS-1
Zambia District
This table indicates the subnational unit used for the simulation of the
third counterfactual, optimal allocation of teachers within subnational
units, for each country.
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Figure D.1: Distribution of PTRs by hardship allowance category in
Mozambique
Data sources: Education Management Information System, Ministerio de Educacao e
Desenvolvimento Humano, Mozambque (2016) and Conselho de Ministros, Decreto n◦ 91/2009.
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
K
er
ne
l d
en
si
ty
0 50 100 150 200 250
PTR
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Figure D.2: Distribution of PTRs by quartile of teacher retention rates in
Uganda
Data source: Education Management Information System, Ministry of Education, Uganda
(2016).
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Appendix to Chapter 6: Human
resource misallocation in other
public sectors? Evidence from the
staffing of Zambian and English
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Figure E.1: Distribution of PHRs across primary care facilities in Zambia
- including facilities without official catchment population counts
Sample comprised of all primary care facilities with GPS coordinates and staffing data.
Health workers include all medical staff. Facilities are weighted by catchment population.
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Figure E.2: PHR distribution by quartile of nighttime luminosity in
Zambia
Nighttime luminosity at a health facility is defined as mean luminosity within a circle of
3km radius around the facility. Data is from the Earth Observation Group, NOAA National
Geophysical Data Center (VIIRS 2015).
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Figure E.3: PHR distribution by quartile of travel time to closest city in
Zambia
Travel time to closest city is taken from the accessibility to cities data set from the Malaria Atlas
Project at Oxford University (Weiss et al. 2018).
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